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Differences in psychological needs and interests have been connected to the 
endorsement of different belief systems (Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009, p. 314). In 
2017, Jost summarized findings connecting existential, relational and epistemic needs 
to ideology (Jost, 2017, p. 167). This thesis reevaluates the reported results concerning 
their assessment of ideology, differentiating between indirect and direct measures, 
symbolic and operational as well as economic and social ideology. Further, additional 
information on direct measures was derived from the source samples indicated in Jost, 
2017. A total of 295 effect sizes was analyzed. Overall, Jost’s (2017) results were 
reproducible, with the averages reported in it and the results found never deviating 
more than r = .10 from each other and straying r ≤ .05 in nearly 89%. Next, separate 
analyses were conducted to assess the impact of scale-type on the results. Indirect 
and direct averages differed around r(8) = .12 (.35 < r < .03) from each other, the 
symbolic and operational averages deviated r(9) = .07 (0 < r < .28) and social and 
economic ideology differed on average the most with around r(8) = .19 (0 < r < .36). 
As the sample size for social and economic ideology was rather small, an overall 
average across the epistemic needs was assessed as well, supporting the previously 
established impact of measures with the average magnitude sizes deviating r = .21 
from each other. All in all, the findings support a more detailed differentiation on 
measures of ideology in regard of asymmetric psychological predispositions, with 
averages of different measures only coinciding in three cases and deviating r ≥ .05 in 
16 out of 25 cases. 
 
1. Introduction 
Political ideology has been of scientific interest for decades and across fields, being examined 
from a political, social and psychological perspective (Jost, Fitzsimons & Kay, 2004, pp. 264; 
Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009, p. 309). A recurring question in this context is what exactly 
draws an individual towards one (and not another) ideology. Depending on the perspective 
taken, the answers focus on different areas to offer explanation for the endorsement of certain 
ideological beliefs. One such explanation draws back on psychological predispositions that 
are supposed to lead individuals to be attracted towards ideological contents (Jost, Federico 
& Napier, 2009, p. 314). In 2017, Jost summarized the current state of research regarding 
such asymmetries in ideologies, compiling results on the relation of epistemic, existential and 
relational motives (Jost, 2017, p. 171-194). The overall results were a clear indication of 
ideology being connected to psychological needs, supporting the idea of individuals being 
attracted to ideology partly because of structural fits between an ideology’s content and an 
individual’s needs and interests (Jost, 2017, p. 167). However, the assumption of 
asymmetrical psychological predispositions in ideologies is by no means generally 
acknowledged, with meta-analyses producing inconsistent results (see e.g. Jost, Sterling & 
Stern, 2018; Ditto et al., 2019, p. 286). While meta-analyses are generally hard to compare 
(Schulze, 2004, p. 191), the contradicting results, in combination with the intense debate (Jost, 
2017, p. 195; Ditto et al., 2019, p. 283), are still puzzling.  
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To tap into this problem, this thesis will take a closer look on the measures used to assess 
ideology by Jost (2017), to see whether the used measures have an impact on the results. 
First, the terms ideology, conservatism and liberalism are clarified and popular approaches to 
explain their endorsement are introduced. The results reported by Jost (2017) are epitomized 
and compared to the results reported with the cited (Jost, 2017) source’s results. Afterwards, 
the found results are categorized according to their type of scale and supplemented with 
additional findings on direct measures from the source samples. Following, the averages 
reported by Jost (2017) are compared to the averages calculated based on the findings from 
the reported source samples. To estimate the impact of measurements to assess ideology, 
sets of analyses were conducted that separately calculate the average effect sizes for the 
relation of epistemic needs according to the used measure-types.  However, because of the 
time and extent limitations of this thesis, the focus exclusively lies on the asymmetries in 
ideologies regarding epistemic needs.  
2.  Ideology  
Liberalism, nationalism, ideologies of Left and Right (Schwarzmantel, 2008, p. 25), 
traditionalism (Johnson & Tamney, 2001, p. 234), conservatism (Grossmann & Hopkins, 2016, 
p. 71) – there are many terms that are connected to ideology. And even though the general 
public seems to have a basic understanding of ideological content, at the same time, this 
knowledge proves to be shallow at best (Jost, Federico & Napier, pp. 316). Furthermore, while 
ideology had and has an important role in politics (Schwarzmantel, 2008, p. 8, p. 19), the term 
ideology is seldom used in a flattering way but instead is negatively connotated 
(Schwarzmantel, 2008, p. 25). So, what exactly is this concept everyone seems to know and 
at the same time lacks the knowledge in?  
2.1 Concept and classifications of ideology 
The interest to better understand ideology has especially risen in the context of the dramatic 
20th century that was characterized by ideological conflict, warfare and genocide. Starting with 
the Frankfurt School that focused on Marx and Freud, ideology was defined as a set of socially 
shared beliefs that give humans meaning and inspiration but can also lead to social illusions 
regarding social arrangements and endanger individual freedom (Jost, Fitzsimons & Kay, 
2004, pp. 264). These potential risks have been a core component of approaches defining 
ideologies for a long time. Conceptualized in line with dogmatism, they were understood as 
systems simplifying the complex world to a degree that it no longer truly relates to the real 
world, or even as dangerous instruments of social control, feeding totalitarian systems. 
However, this negative definition of ideology has been challenged since the 1960s and 
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ideology was redefined in neutral terms (Heywood, 2017, pp. 8).  Nowadays, social sciences 
conceptualize ideologies as sets of ideas or beliefs that address societal order, modelling a 
desirable society (Schwarzmantel, 2008, p. 25; Jost, 2017, p 186). It includes three features: 
(1) a perspective of the current world, a “world-view”, (2) a vision of how a better society would 
look like and (3) the means by which this changed order should be realized or maintained. 
(Heywood, 2017, p. 10; Erikson & Tedin, 2001, p. 64). These notions are socially shared and 
therefore contribute to an individual’s sense of belonging to a certain group as well as identity 
(Jost, 2017, p. 168). Political ideologies thus are normative calls for a better society, aiming 
and contributing to unify individuals to change the future according to a system of beliefs 
(Schwarzmantel, 2008, p. 26).  
Historically, these systems of beliefs have been categorized on a linear axis: differentiating 
between “the right” and “the left”. On this axis, while communism would be an ideology of the 
very left, fascism would be its right pendant, enclosing (from left to right) socialism, liberalism 
and conservatism (Heywood, 2017, p. 15). This left-right categorization mirrors the old seating 
arrangements of the French Assembly hall during the late-eighteenth century. Supporters of 
the old establishment sat on the right side, while the opponents of the status quo sat on the 
left, splitting the room according to a first core difference, the preference for stability versus 
change (Jost, Federico & Napier, p. 310). A second, interrelated but distinguishable core 
dimension of the struggle between the left and the right is the acceptance of inequality versus 
the advocating of equality (Jost et al., 2003b, p. 342).  
In more detail, liberalism is a doctrine promoting structures such as free press and elections 
as well as stressing the importance of a free individual (Žižek, 2012, p. 9). They support a 
government that is highly active in healthcare as well as welfare and see chances in planned 
changes. On the other hand, the conservative values tradition, order, are thought to venerate 
authority and prefer a less interfering government, with law-and-order and national security 
being exceptions. They are perceived as more moralistic and religious, while liberals are 
perceived as more permissive (Erikson & Tedin, 2001, pp. 65). Thus, the labeling of liberals 
and conservatives as “left” and “right” stems from a conflict that dates back at least to the 
French Revolution. As this substitution of labels has become more and more common, 
especially in the USA (Jost, Federico & Napier, p. 310), this thesis will use the terms “left” and 
“liberal” as well as “right” and “conservative” interchangeably as well.  
However, this singular left-right categorization has lately been criticized as too simplifying and 
insufficient. For example, as complex structures, ideologies often unify contradicting elements, 
which can make it difficult to categorize them based on a single criterion. For instance, 
anarchism features both, anarcho-communist and anarcho-capitalist elements, which qualifies 
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it for being both, a far-left and a far-right ideology. A possible alternative is the 
conceptualization on a two-dimensional spectrum, e.g. with an Authority-Liberty axis, next to 
the traditional Left-Right dimension. Another criticism concerns similarities of the far-left and 
the far-right. It is often argued that extreme positions on the one-dimensional ideology axis 
resemble each other more than the more centrists do, calling for a horseshoe rather than a 
linear spectrum of ideologies (Heywood, 2017, pp. 16). Some go even further and suggest an 
independent dimensional structure of liberal and conservative attitudes (Tetlock, 1985, p. 746). 
Still, the unidimensional conservative-liberal conceptualization remains a popular way to 
categorize ideology (Heywood, 2017, p. 15; Everett, 2013, p. 2). This approach is, at least 
partially, supported by factorial studies. Even though “liberal” and “conservative” attitudes 
seem to be not entirely dependent on each other, measures of liberalism and conservatism 
also appear to not be entirely independent either (Jost, Federico & Napier, pp. 312). As the 
reviewed literature in this thesis does not include non-binary measurements for ideology, this 
work won’t be able to shed light on possible implications a poly-dimensional conceptualization 
would have in the context of asymmetries in ideologies. Instead, it will focus on differences 
and similarities between individuals that score differently on the common conservative-liberal 
axis. 
2.2 What draws individuals towards (different) ideologies?  
With classifying ideologies on a left-right dimension, the question of what draws individuals to 
a certain ideological direction arises. There have been many approaches that can help 
understanding ideology and what attracts people to it. Important approaches include Cognitive 
Dissonance Theory, Just World Theory, Terror Management Theory and System Justification 
Theory (Jost, Fitzsimons & Kay, 2004, pp. 264). A striking part of ideological beliefs is their 
power to legitimate actions that would usually be inexcusable. With the Cognitive Dissonance 
Theory’s emphasis on the role of justification and rationalization for humans in a social context, 
it poses first theoretical explanations for this phenomenon. However, in the context of ideology, 
Cognitive Dissonance Theory focuses too narrowly on self-justification of hypocrisy. It lacks in 
explaining dynamics of complex ideologies and doesn’t give information on why people justify 
the status quo when there is no personal choice or responsibility involved (Jost, Fitzsimons & 
Kay, 2004, p. 265). The Just World Theory on the other hand lays its focus on the relationship 
between humans and their environment, theorizing humans to have universal needs to feel in 
control of their surroundings. Here, ideological beliefs are understood to offer the illusion that 
“people get what they deserve and deserve what they get” and therefore to enable such control 
(Jost, Fitzsimons & Kay, 2004; pp. 265). However, this theory provides little information on 
why political beliefs vary and how they differ in causes and consequences. These variations 
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are accounted for by the Terror Management Theory that stresses defensive responses, 
stemming from existential anxiety triggered by threats to self-esteem and/or mortality 
reminders. Behavioral and ideological responses to such threat are thought to possibly vary; 
yet, this theory does not include information concerning distinctive determinants of specific 
ideologies (Jost, Fitzsimons & Kay, 2004, p. 266). Like the Terror Management Theory, the 
System Justification Theory sees threats to the system as triggers to intensify the justification 
of the existing social system. Here, cognitive, motivational, social and structural factors all 
contribute to the tendency to rationalize existing social, economic and political arrangements, 
even if they are contradictory to self- or in-group interests (Jost, 2019, p. 3). 
All these approaches place factors for the preference of an ideology in surroundings as well 
as in self-inherent factors of an individual. The literature categorizes these factors into top-
down and bottom-up processes, with top-down processes focusing on effects of the political 
environment and bottom-up processes stressing the importance of an individual’s 
psychological characteristics (Jost, 2009, pp. 132).  
2.2.1 Top-down processes 
Top-down processes focus on the political environment for explaining ideological preferences 
and shifts. For example, political elites have an impact on ideological structures and content 
(Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009, pp. 314). In fact, even though Non-Government-Organizations 
have been shown to increasingly influence the political agenda (Layman & Carsey, 2002, p. 
800), it can be argued that it is a minority within politics that constructs ideology. It is this 
minority that is perceived as having a major impact on the ideological discourse: stressing, 
introducing and overplaying certain ideas, topics and arguments (Federico & Goren, 2009, p. 
271; Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009, pp. 315). With them institutionally and structurally having 
such power, political issues are most likely disproportionately portrayed and concluded in favor 
of the small and unrepresentative ruling groups. Yet, the political elite of a society seldom 
belongs exclusively to one ideological belief system but rather spreads from the right to the 
left side. They create an ideological “menu” ordinary citizen can refer to for e.g. voting and 
preferences of policies. However, constructing a system of beliefs and successfully spreading 
it are two different things (Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009, p. 316). Thus, it is not surprising that 
different levels of political sophistication concerning ideologies and their contents among the 
mass public have been found, with the general citizen having relatively low ideological 
constraint (Bennet, 2006, p. 117, 123; Barber & Pope, 2018, p. 119). Yet, this doesn’t mean 
that ordinary citizens know nothing of ideological content (Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009, p. 
316). While political knowledge is a major factor for ideological consistency and constraint 
(Barber & Pope, 2018, p. 115), data also suggests that even the relatively uninterested know 
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at least the core differences of liberal and conservative stands (Freeze & Montgomery, 2016, 
p. 20, 25). Lately, the consumption of partisan news channels was also shown to increase the 
ability of individuals to correctly perceive ideological differences of the political elite (Darr & 
Dunaway, 2018, p. 964).  Therefore, it seems like most people possess at least a latent form 
of ideologies and ideological understanding and that political elites, such as politicians and 
media, indeed play a role in the context of ideology (Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009, p. 315-
317). 
Usually, top-down processes refer only to acquisition of attitudes that were mediated over 
ideological content produced by political elites (Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009, p. 314). 
However, the social environment of an individual can influence ideological attitudes beyond. 
For example, close personal relationships such as family and peers also affect political 
ideological beliefs of an individual. For example, it has been shown that individuals express 
more conservative attitudes after having recalled an interaction with a conservative parent, 
stressing the importance of such reference groups for ideological beliefs (Jost, Ledgerwood & 
Hardin, 2008, p. 179). Further, various psychological variables connected to an individual’s 
environment have proven to influence ideological attitudes. Specifically, death anxiety, system 
instability and fear of threat and loss have been found to predict political conservatism (Jost, 
2003, p. 339). 
2.2.2. Bottom-up processes 
While political sciences tend to focus on top-down processes of ideology, the psychological 
perspective usually stresses psychological antecedents of ideological beliefs. Assuming that 
ability and motivation but also interest affects the understanding and openness to ideological 
messages, the endorsed ideology of an individual should not only say something about their 
political environment but also about their psychological characteristics (Jost, Federico & 
Napier, 2009, p. 314, 317). While some reject the idea of a link between distinctive personality 
traits and affinities towards certain ideological beliefs (Jost, 2017, pp. 194), the idea of a 
connection between ideas and interests is actually not too young. Goethe wrote in his novel 
“Die Wahlverwandtschaften” “every attraction is reciprocal” (dt. “jede Anziehung ist 
wechselseitig” (Goethe, 1840, p. 216). This concept, translated as “elective affinity” in English, 
introduces a bidirectional concept of ideas. While people are understood to be able to choose 
them, it also suggests reciprocal processes, with ideas being able to choose people to a 
certain extent as well (Jost, 2009, p. 133). 
Early thoughts on such personality-based preferences for not only certain ideas but ideologies 
can be traced back to the Nazi psychologist Erich Jaensch, who differentiated between a 
certain “J-Type” and an “S-Type”. While the former was characterized by firm, consistently 
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pursued beliefs, the latter would judge situations ambiguously and without much persistence. 
Further, the J-Type would believe that human behavior is inherited, while the S-Type would 
stress environment and education as determinants (Carney et al., 2008, p. 810). Since then, 
approaches to connect ideology with psychological variables have come a long way. Many 
have tried to unveil whether and in which way psychological aspects are related to political 
attitudes. From influential work on authoritarianism by Adorno et al. (Spears & Tausch, 2014, 
p. 512), to left-wing “biophilous characters” and right-wing “necrophilous characters”, 
assessed on “live-loving” and “mechanical” scales to the inclusion of emotional differences, 
there indeed have been several approaches (Carney et al., 2008, p. 810-815). 
In line with this perspective, Jost (2017, pp. 168) suggests that different ideologies answer to 
different needs and therefore attract different kinds of mindsets. This notion leads to two 
important implications. First, ideologies do not, contrary to a common assumption, cater the 
same psychological needs to the same extent. Indeed, there has been found evidence 
supporting this statement (Hennes et al., 2012, p. 680). Second, ideologies can be understood 
as motivated social cognition, used to give sought out meaning to an individual and their 
political environment (Jost et al., 2017, p. 343). Specifically, three categories that connect with 
conservative and liberal ideology on different levels have been found: relational, existential 
and epistemic motives (Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009, p. 308).  
Relational motives sum up the desire to connect with others and to build interpersonal 
relationships, as well as the wish for personal and social identification. These are e.g. sought 
out in form of solidarity with others or a shared reality (Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009, p. 309). 
There are some indications for a relational aspect in ideology. For instance, data indicates 
conservatism to be related to personal valuation of conformity and a heightened desire to 
share reality with others sharing the same beliefs (Jost et al., 2018, p. 78, p. 79; Cavazza & 
Mucchi-Faina, 2008, p. 340). Interestingly, conservatives were not only shown to have 
heightened needs to share reality, but they also perceived such ingroup consensus more often 
(Stern et al., 2014, p. 1165). Further, data shows relations of political attitudes in children with 
the ones of their parents. Such transgression of partisanship from parents to children seems 
to be especially successful if the parents themselves hold stable attitudes, are interested in 
politics and if they talk about politics with their children (Sears & Brown, 2013, p. 4). In addition 
to parents, peers are also known for influencing ideological preferences (Jost, Federico & 
Napier, 2009, p. 322). With political attitudes becoming increasingly stable with adulthood, 
such influences seem to be especially potent through childhood and early adulthood (Sears & 
Brown, 2013, p. 18).  
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Additionally, in giving meaning to their life, assuring them to be worthy and living in a secure 
and meaningful system, as well as offering a way to deal with threatening circumstances, 
conservatism is argued to cater to existential motives (Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009, p. 320). 
Here, fear of death, mortality salience and threat are shown to correlate with conservatism or 
even facilitate a conservative shift, with not only originally conservatives but also liberals 
exhibiting more conservative attitudes in such cases (Hennes et al., 2012, p. 678; Jost et al., 
2017, p. 339, p. 341). This supports the former assumption that ideologies do not cater to the 
same needs to the same extent but instead answer different motives (Hennes et al., 2012, p. 
680). 
Finally, conservatism and liberalism respond to epistemic motives. By offering certainty, 
explanations, evaluations and orientation, they address needs to reduce uncertainty and 
ambiguity, lower complexity and provide structure order, as well as closure (Jost, Federico & 
Napier, 2009, p. 318). Indeed, evidence supports a linkage between varying epistemic needs 
and ideological preferences. While intolerance of ambiguity, personal needs for order, 
structure and closure are associated with conservatism, openness to new experience, need 
for cognition and tolerance of uncertainty were shown to empirically relate with liberalism (Jost, 
2017, pp. 174, p. 176, pp. 178; Thorisdottir, Jost & Kay, 2009, p. 16).  
Interestingly, data suggests that such personality differences between liberals and 
conservatives can be traced back as far as into childhood, with personalities of later becoming 
to self-identify as liberals or conservatives already differing during preschool. Individuals who 
self-categorized themselves as liberal in their adulthood were described by their teachers as 
self-reliant, energetic, emotionally expressive, gregarious and impulsive in childhood. On the 
other hand, conservatives were perceived as rigid, inhibited, indecisive, fearful and 
overcontrolled during their childhood. This is especially interesting in this context, as children 
at this age don’t have a set idea of ideological beliefs yet, supporting the assumption that 
certain ideological content does attract specific psychological variables (Block & Block, 2005, 
pp. 734).  
As already mentioned, there is also criticism regarding the suggestion of psychological 
antecedents for differences in ideological preferences. For example, referring to the rigidity of 
the left (Jost, 2017, p. 170), critiques suggest that the psychological profiles would rather differ 
between people of the political center and extreme positions, disagreeing with the notion of 
distinctive psychological characteristics for conservatives and liberalists (Jost, 2009, p. 135). 
However, data suggests that, while there might be a connection between closed-mindedness 
and ideological extremity, conservatives still score higher compared to liberals when adjusting 
for distance from the political center (Jost et al., 2003a, pp. 389). Further, even after adjusting 
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for ideological extremity, uncertainty and threat management were found to still correlate with 
conservatism. Additionally, while individual differences in death anxiety contributed to 
conservatism, such a connection was not established for general ideological extremity (Jost 
et al., 2007, p. 1004). It therefore seems like there indeed is a special affinity of certain 
psychological variables with conservatism rather than with general extremism (Jost, 2009, p. 
136). 
Thus, it seems like both – environmental and psychological variables – offer valuable insight 
for understanding ideological preferences of individuals (Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009, p. 
314). 
While some research focuses on the asymmetries in ideologies, other work repeatedly finds 
symmetries between the left and the right. For example, there has been work suggesting that 
conservatism as a social motivated cognition is connected to partisan bias (Ditto et al., 2019, 
p. 275) via heightened dogmatism and high need for structure and closure (Jost et al., 2003b, 
p. 339). Yet, Ditto et al. (2019) meta-analyzed 51 experiential studies on the topic of partisan 
bias, which’s results indicated a rather contradicting outcome to the evidence supporting 
asymmetrical psychological variables for conservatism and liberalism. While conservatives did 
indeed exhibit partisan bias during decision making based on politically congenial and 
uncongenial information, they found such partisan bias to be just as strong among liberals 
(Ditto et al., 2009, p. 280). 
However, the notion of asymmetries in ideologies doesn’t claim that there aren’t any 
symmetries in the psychology of liberals and conservatives. It suggests that in addition to 
generic psychological processes applying to the left and right alike, there are also 
differentiating psychological antecedents (Jost, 2017, pp. 170). Furthermore, none of the 
psychological variables associated with conservatism or liberalism are evaluated as being 
“better” or “inferior” than the other. It depends on the context, whether a trait is advantageous 
or disadvantageous and therefore shouldn’t be evaluated without such environmental 
demands (Jost, 2017, p. 195). 
Still, the topic of psychological asymmetries in ideologies remains a controversial one, with 
seemingly contradicting results, challenging theoretical underpinnings and supporting data on 
both sides (Jost, 2017; Ditto et al., 2019). At the very least, it remains a field that would benefit 
from more research and deeper insights. While the work on symmetries in ideologies is 
compelling as well, this thesis takes a closer look at the research addressing the asymmetries 
summarized by Jost (2017), specifically asymmetries regarding epistemic motivation. 
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3. Jost (2017) – psychological differences of the left and right 
The meta-analysis by Jost (2017) reviewed the work on asymmetries in ideology, focusing on 
relational, epistemic and existential motives. Regarding studies on epistemic motives, the 
used data stems from a former meta-analysis by Jost, Sterling & Stern (2017, published 2018), 
which summarized data of 181 distinct samples from 14 countries, summing up to 133,796 
individual participants. Separate analyses were conducted for nine different categories: 
dogmatism, cognitive/perceptual rigidities, need for cognitive closure, personal needs for order 
and structure, intolerance of ambiguity, need for cognition, cognitive reflection, integrative 
complexity and tolerance of uncertainties (Jost, 2017, p. 171).  
While especially dogmatism and cognitive rigidity were associated with conservatism, the 
smallest effect sizes were observed for uncertainty tolerance. Still, all nine variables turned 
out to be significantly correlated with conservatism and liberalism, even though the effect sizes 
differed in regard of magnitude (see Figure 1) (Jost, Sterling & Stern., 2018, pp. 64). The 
following will give a short insight into the specific findings for each category.
 
Figure 1. Weighted average effect sizes for studies investigating hypotheses of political ideology being 
associated with epistemic needs. PNOS: personal needs for order and structure; CP rigidity: cognitive 
and perceptual rigidity; number of studies included marked as N 
Source. This figure was modeled after the meta-analysis by Jost, Sterling & Stern (2018) and Jost 
(2017) 
 
Dogmatism, as introduced by Rokeach in the mid-1900s has to be understood in the context 
of authoritarianism. Trying to free the hitherto popular measure of authoritarianism of 
ideological content, he conceptualized a general authoritarianism as a cognitive style, naming 
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it dogmatism (Brown, 2004, p. 66). It focuses on closed-mindedness, characterized by a 
central set of beliefs concerning reality that includes convictions about absolute authority, 
constructing a framework for intolerance (Rokeach, 1954, p. 203). His dogmatism scale, 
introduced in 1956 is widely used in the psychological field and consists of ideologically neutral 
items (Jost et al., 2003b, p. 353) such as “There are two kinds of people in this world: those 
who are for the truth and those who are against the truth”, “To compromise with our political 
opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side”, “Of all the 
different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct”, 
“Most people are failures and it is the system which is responsible for this”  and “It is only 
natural that a person would have a much better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than 
with ideas he opposes” (Rokeach, 1956, p. 7-9). Since conservatives are thought to prefer 
structure and order and valuing tradition in opposition to novelty, social change and ambiguity, 
they are theorized to relate to the psychological construct of dogmatism (Choma et al., 2012, 
p. 433). To test whether dogmatism and political orientation on a right-left axis would correlate, 
they scrutinized 77 samples out of which 68 supported the hypothesis that dogmatism would 
be stronger amongst the political right. In only one case there was a negative significant 
relationship reported (Jost, Sterling & Stern, 2018, p. 68). Overall, both unweighted (r = .48) 
and weighted (r = .51) average effect sizes turned out to be positive and relatively large (Jost, 
2017, p. 171). 
Cognitive rigidity commonly refers to a resistance of an individual to change their beliefs, 
attitudes or habits, in addition to tending to develop or insist on using established mental or 
behavioral patterns (Greenberg, Reiner & Meiran, 2012, p. 1). Usually, cognitive or perceptual 
rigidity is measured with objective behavioral tasks (Jost, 2017, p. 171), such as the Rosch’s 
Cognitive Representations of Semantic Categories task (Rock & Janoff-Bulman, 2010, p. 28) 
or the Similarity-matching Navon task (Caparos et al., 2015, p. 157). Such tests measure 
tendencies to exclude non-prototypical examples from categories (Jost, 2017, p. 171). The 
Breskin (1968) rigidity test asks participants to rate their preference for abstract visual symbols, 
out of which some were modeled in accordance to the Gestalt course, while others were 
designed to alter the course of Praegnanz. For example, the participants are inclined to 
choose between (1) two triangles, with a smaller one being perfectly placed in the middle of a 
bigger sized one and (2) two triangles, one smaller, one bigger, being arranged offset. Here, 
more rigid individuals are assumed to show preference for the “better” fit – in this case fit 1 
(Breskin, 1968, p. 1203). Classic personality theories postulate that character rigidity is related 
to endorsing conservative beliefs (Jost et al., 2003b, p. 340). Indeed, Jost, Sterling & Stern 
(2018, p. 67) identified 16 studies investigating whether conservatism is empirically connected 
to perceptual or cognitive rigidity. The hypothesis that conservatives would score higher than 
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liberals on perceptual or cognitive rigidity measures was supported in nine studies and in 
additional six, the effect did not reach significance, yet the results were still in the predicted 
direction. The overall unweighted (r = .32) and weighted (r = .38) average effect sizes were 
not only fairly large but also significant (Jost, 2017, p. 171). 
Needs for cognitive closure represents a personality disposition that describes the desire for 
a clear interpretation of the world, avoiding ambiguity and ambivalent cues. Individuals with 
heightened needs for cognitive closure prefer order, seek for predictability and certainty but 
when confronted with inconsistencies they feel stressed and are reluctant to accept 
information conflicting set beliefs and opinions. Not surprisingly, this disposition is connected 
to other psychological variables such as closed-mindedness and intolerance of ambiguity and 
is generally seen to impact an individuals’ epistemic motivation (Panno et al., 2018, p. 104). A 
common way to measure need for closure is the need for closure scale, conceptualized by 
Webster and Kruglanski (Jost et al., 2003, p. 348). This scale consists of five different 
dimensions: preference for order and structure, affective discomfort related to ambiguity, 
urgency and impatience to come to congruent, closed judgments and decisions, desire for 
predictability and closed-mindedness and sums up to 42 items. Specifically, the scale contains 
items such as “I think that having clear rules and order at work is essential for success”, “I'd 
rather know bad news than stay in a state of uncertainty” and “I do not usually consult many 
different opinions before forming my own view” (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994, p. 1050).  Jost 
et al. derived their motivated social cognition model from need for cognitive closure theory, 
proposing that people belonging to the right-wing political spectrum would show heightened 
desires to avoid uncertainty and risks, insofar as conservatism might answer especially well 
to needs of epistemic stability, clarity, order and uniformity (Jost et al., 2003b, pp. 340, pp. 
344, p. 348). Jost, Sterling and Stern (2018, p. 66) identified 100 tests across seven different 
countries of the hypothesis that conservatism would be linked to heightened need for cognitive 
closure. This hypothesis was upheld in 79 cases and the overall unweighted (r = .23) and 
weighted (r = .19) average effect sizes were indeed positive and significant. 
Personal needs for structure can be defined as a chronic need to avoid ambiguity and 
unpredictability by having the tendency to perceive the world as fitting into simplified schemata 
as well as acting according to set routines, thus structuring one’s personal environment into a 
less complex form (Meiser & Machunsky, 2008, p. 27; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993, p. 113). 
Such simple, i.e. homogenous, clear and distinct structures enable the individual to form clear 
interpretation of new information with minimal use of cognitive resources (Neuberg & Newsom, 
1993, pp. 113). Typically, this psychological variable is assessed using questionnaires (Jost, 
Sterling & Stern, 2018, p. 66). These questionnaires feature items such as “It upsets me to go 
into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it”, “I find that a well-ordered life with 
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regular hours makes my life tedious” and “I become uncomfortable when the rules in a 
situation are not clear” (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993, p. 131). There are several theories 
connecting conservatism to heightened personal needs for order and structure, such as 
theories of authoritarianism and uncertainty avoidance (Jost et al., 2003b, p. 358). 
Investigating this connection, out of 36 studies across six different countries, the hypothesis 
of conservatives scoring higher on personal needs for order and structure than liberals was 
upheld in 24 studies. In another ten studies, while the effect was not found to be significant, it 
still was in the predicted direction. Overall, both unweighted (r = .20) and weighted (r = .18), 
were positive and significant (Jost, 2017, p. 171; Jost, Sterling & Stern, 2018, p. 66). 
Tolerance of ambiguity can be defined as “the way an individual […] perceives and processes 
information about ambiguous situations or stimuli when confronted by an array of unfamiliar, 
complex or incongruent clues” (Furnham & Ribchester, 1995, p. 179). In turn, intolerance of 
ambiguity describes the tendency to react to such ambiguity with psychological discomfort. 
Thus, in new, unfamiliar or complex situations, individuals with low tolerance of ambiguity are 
theorized to experience psychological stress and have heightened ambitions to avoid such 
situations or contradictory cues. On the other hand, individuals with high tolerance are 
believed to not feel such discomfort. (Hancock et al., 2015, p. 114). There is a wide range of 
techniques of measurement when it comes to tolerance of ambiguity, including questionnaires 
such as the scale developed by Budner in 1962 (Jost et al., 2003b, p. 353). The scale features 
items such as “An expert who doesn't come up with a definite answer probably doesn't know 
too much”, “I like parties where I know most of the people more than ones where all or most 
of the people are complete strangers” and “Many of our most important decisions are based 
upon insufficient information”, Budner (1962, p. 34). With this, Budner’s construct of tolerance 
of ambiguity not only assumes an aversion of ambiguity of individuals with low tolerance but 
even suggests individuals with high tolerance to actively seek out equivocal stimuli (Hancock 
et al., 2015, p. 115). Regarding political attitudes, a major psychological model theorizes 
individuals endorsing right-wing orientated attitudes to have higher needs of cognitive closure 
and them to be less tolerant of uncertainty and ambiguity than their left counter parts (Caparos 
et al., 2015, p. 155). Testing this hypothesis of conservatives to be less tolerant of ambiguity 
than liberals, 33 of 44 cases supported such assumption with intolerance of ambiguity 
correlating positively and significantly with right-wing orientation (Jost, Sterling et al., p. 66). 
There has been no case observed, where liberals were less tolerant of ambiguity and the 
overall effect sizes, unweighted (r = .26) and weighted (r = .20) were again positive and 
significant (Jost, 2017, p. 172).  
A popular approach to understand information processing is the dual process theory, 
suggesting that human information processing can operate in two distinct ways. The first way 
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to process information would be associative, heavily driven by heuristics, while the second 
way could be described as deliberative, analytic and based on systematic reasoning (Kahan, 
2013, p. 408; Pennycook & Rand, 2019, p. 224). Since conservatives are believed to rely more 
heavily on heuristic information processing and liberals are argued to think more analytically, 
it can be assumed that they score higher in need for cognition (Talhelm et al., 2015, pp. 251; 
Jost, Sterling & Stern, 2018, p. 69). Need for cognition has been defined as an individual’s 
“tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive endeavors” (Cacioppo et al., 1996, p. 197). 
While individuals high in need for cognition are thought to naturally process information by 
seeking, thinking about and reflecting to interpret their surroundings and stimuli, people low in 
cognition are proposed to rely on cues given by other persons such as celebrities or experts 
and cognitive heuristics to make sense of their world (Cacioppo et al., 1996, p. 198). This 
psychological disposition can be measured with questionnaires, featuring items such as “I find 
satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours”, “I would prefer a task that is intellectual, 
difficult, and important to one that is somewhat important but does not require much thought” 
and “I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them” (Cacioppo et al., 1996, p. 
253). Jost, Sterling and Stern (2018, p. 67) found 40 samples testing the relationship of left- 
and right-wing orientation and need for cognition. In 25 of these cases, the association 
observed was indeed significant and negative with conservatism and in only three cases an 
opposite relationship was found. Overall, the average unweighted (r = -.16) and weighted (r = 
-.09) effect sizes were significant and negative, although relatively small in magnitude.  
Further, from the dual process theory, another hypothesis other than the assumption that 
conservatives score lower on need for cognition, can be derived. Specifically, conservatives 
are theorized to score lower on cognitive reflection, which refers to the tendency of an 
individual to rely more on heuristics and intuition or on reflection in their reasoning, thus to 
either process information in a heuristic or analytical manner (Deppe et al., 2015, p. 315). 
Amongst others, cognitive reflection can be measured using the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(Frederick, 2005), which is composed of three items, designed to determine whether the 
subject answered the question intuitively, resulting in an incorrect answer, or whether they 
would reflect their answers, resulting in the correct response (Deppe et al., 2015, p. 315). One 
such question is: “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. 
How much does the ball cost?” (Frederick, 2005, p. 27). While the intuitive answer would be 
$.10, the correct answer is $.05. Thus, the answer given would indicate whether the individual 
processes information in a more intuitive or analytical manner (Deppe et al., 2015, p. 315). In 
line with Talhelm et al. ’s (2015, pp. 251) argumentation, liberals should think more analytically, 
as they are less conformity orientated. Studies investigating such connection of ideology and 
cognitive reflection showed that there seems to be such a connection. In the 13 studies 
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analyzed, 11 studies upheld such hypothesis and negative and significant unweighted (r = 
-.13) and weighted (r = -.10) average effect sizes indicated that conservatives are indeed less 
cognitive reflective (Jost, Sterling & Stern, 2018, p. 69; Jost, 2017, p. 176).  
Integrative complexity describes the extent to which an individual differentiates among multiple 
perspectives and to which degree they integrate such complexity to their argumentation (Jost 
et al., 2003b, p. 353). It therefore measures a central part of deliberativeness, namely the 
degree to which contributions in favor or against a given proposition are supported with 
arguments (Brundidge et al., 2014, p. 743). In contrast to research concerning relations of 
political ideology and e.g. dogmatism and rigidity, which usually focuses on the general 
population, research on integrative complexity has had a predominant focus on the political 
elites. To measure integrative complexity, usually content-analytic techniques are employed 
(Jost et al., 2003b, p. 353), analyzing e.g. the structure of written passages (Conway et al., 
2016, p. 783) or the used language in terms of exclusive and tentative vocabulary, negations 
and conjunctions (Brundidge et al., 2014, p. 747). It can be theorized that liberals think more 
analytically since they value individualism, have looser social bonds and endorse individual 
identities over group identities, in contrast to conservatives, who prioritize loyalty, authority 
and sanctity (Talhelm et al., 2015, pp. 251). This would culturally make them less open to the 
integration of multiple perspectives on a topic. Jost, Sterling & Stern (2018, p. 67) analyzed 
40 samples on the hypothesis that political ideology is correlated with integrative complexity. 
Out of these, they identified 20 cases that upheld such hypothesis, with significant negative 
relationships between integrative complexity and conservatism. Even though the opposite 
relationship was observed in two cases, the overall negative and significant effect sizes, 
unweighted (r = -.19) and weighted (r = -.15), support the initial hypothesis of integrative 
complexity being more endorsed by the left-wing. 
Intolerance of uncertainty describes the tendency to react negatively towards equivocal stimuli 
possibly having negative consequences. Although ambiguity intolerance and intolerance for 
uncertainty are often thought to be synonymous, they actually do refer to slightly different 
constructs. Whereas intolerance for ambiguity corresponds to the (in)capacity to deal with 
ambiguous present situations, intolerance for uncertainty tolerance describes the ability to 
deal with an uncertain future, with possible negative consequences. Thus, in case of ambiguity 
intolerance, the present is perceived threatening and in case of uncertainty intolerance, the 
stimuli regarding the future is deemed threatening. While both these constructs do theoretically 
overlap with need for cognitive closure in some facets and are somewhat correlated, this 
overlap is only partial. Need for cognitive closure describes the motivation to pursue or avoid 
cognitive closure, while tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty have their focus on the 
negative reactions to ambivalent situations (Iannello et al., 2017, p. 2). Uncertainty tolerance 
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can be measured in various ways, including aesthetic preferences in art and literature or with 
questionnaires featuring items such as “I can’t stand being taken by surprise” (Jost, Sterling & 
Stern, 2018, p. 64). Since conservatism is understood to be linked with conservation, valuing 
conformity, security and tradition versus openness and stimulation, it can also be associated 
with making decisions based on established rules versus seeking and being open to the novel. 
Thus, conservatism can be theoretically linked to uncertainty tolerance, prioritizing traditional 
values in thought processes and maintaining the known and therefore safe status quo (Malka 
et al., 2014, p. 1032). Such linkage has indeed been found. From 16 investigated cases, 13 
upheld such hypothesis significantly, empirically associating uncertainty tolerance negatively 
with conservatism and the unweighted (r = -.35) and weighted (r = -.07) average effect sizes 
being significant and negative (Jost, Sterling & Stern, 2018, p. 64). 
Overall, the findings of Jost, Sterling and Stern (2018) seem to support the suggestion that 
ideological beliefs can be associated with psychological predispositions connected to 
epistemic motivation, underpinning the idea of conservatism as a motivational social cognition.  
4. Asymmetries or symmetries – a question of measuring? 
On the first glance, the meta-analysis by Jost, Sterling and Stern (2018) does indeed paint a 
uniform picture of psychological underpinnings of asymmetries in ideologies. Most of the 
average effect sizes are significant and even though they might vary in their magnitude, they 
all surpass or at least scrape at r = .10 (Jost, Sterling & Stern, pp. 64 – 69). However, taking 
a closer look at the data, it turns out to not be unanimous, with the predicted directions and 
statistical significance observed in the majority of but not in all samples (Jost, 2017, p. 172 – 
180). Further, the former criticism of the conceptualized individual psychological differences 
also adds to a confusion. How can one meta-analysis come to a seemingly contradictory result 
in regard of ideology and epistemic motivation to another (see Jost, Sterling & Stern, 2018; 
Ditto et al., 2019)? Or to put it in more simple terms: how can the results largely vary when 
measuring the same phenomenon? One possible answer to this question would be because 
they perhaps don’t.  
Schimmack (2019) proposes that one major challenge of today’s psychology is its “validation 
crisis” (Schimmack, 2019, p. 3). In the field of psychology, used measurements often lack in 
construct validity, meaning they don’t measure variations in the construct they are applied for 
but instead measure something else, which might very well be connected to the construct in 
question but should not be mistaken for the same (Schimmack, 2019, p. 3, p. 7, p. 17). 
However, since psychological research usually deals with constructs that are not directly 
observable, building instruments to measure these constructs reliably poses a challenge. This 
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difficulty is mirrored in social sciences practice, where measurements are often used without 
proper references concerning their validity (Flake & Fried, pp. 3). In the context of asymmetries 
in ideologies, this critique opens the question about the used measurements behind this field 
of research. How is ideology operationalized and what impact could these measurements 
have on the results? Exactly which measures make up the term ideology in case of the meta-
analysis by Jost (2017)? 
Though alluring, this thesis will not include a deeper analysis on additional meta-analyses 
such as Ditto et al.’s (2019) study, as the time restrictions of this thesis do not allow a broader 
sample size. Therefore, this thesis will keep its focus on Jost’s presidential address (2017).  
4.1 The current thesis 
Based on the question of the measures used in the studies summarized in Jost’s (2017) paper, 
this thesis will take a closer look at the instruments used to assess ideology and will compare 
the results stemming from different types of scales amongst each other. This might not only 
provide a better insight into the meta-analysis itself but also on the topic of asymmetries in 
ideologies in general as well. It is expected that different types of measures will impact the 
results on asymmetric psychological predispositions, which could offer an explanation to some 
seemingly controversial results in this field. 
Regarding the measurement of ideology, while many studies collect data by means of multiple 
scales, there are several techniques frequently used to assess this concept. For example, 
some directly ask the subjects about their ideological stance (Rock & Janoff-Bulman, p. 28; 
Kossowska & Van Hiel, 2003, p. 506; Kelemen et al., p. 202), others concentrate more on or 
include the evaluation of policies (Soenens,  Duriez & Goossens, 2005, pp. 114; Crowson, 
2009, pp. 455) or use indirect measures such as personality variables to empirically gauge 
ideology (Everett, 2013, pp. 2). This thesis will focus on three specific categories of such 
measures: psychological/indirect versus direct, symbolic versus operational and social versus 
economic scales.  
Indirect measure use concepts related to conservatism to assess ideology (Everett, 2013, p. 
3). As the work by Adorno et al. (1950) on authoritarianism influenced the research in 
underlying psychological variables of political attitudes without doubt (Spears & Tausch, 2014, 
p. 512), it is not too surprising that their concept and developed scale, the F-scale, has been  
further developed and reviewed regarding its informative value on ideology (Adorno et al., 
1950,pp. 262; Everett, 2013, p. 3). One such development is Altemeyer’s Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism (RWA) that combines authoritarian aggression, authoritarian submission and 
conventionality. Presumably, RWA is distinguishable from general conservatism (Knight, 1998, 
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p. 102). Others concluded that RWA is in fact “just another conservatism scale” (Ray, 1985, 
p. 272). Anyhow, RWA has been conceptualized and understood as a measure of 
conservatism, even if designed as a niche form of conservatism (Knight, 1998, pp. 102), 
especially regarding the characteristic resistance towards change of conservatism (Leone & 
Chirumbolo, 2008, p. 757). Another personality variable often named in relation with 
conservatism is an individual’s Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) (Everett, 2013, p. 3). 
SDO is understood as an individual’s inclination to interpret their social environment as a 
competitive jungle in which they desire their own in-group to be superior to outgroups (Pratto 
et al., 1994, p. 742; Soenens, Duriez & Goossens, 2005, p. 111). As such it has been 
connected to the acceptance of inequality characteristic of conservatism (Malka et al., 2014, 
p. 1046; Leone & Chirumbolo, 2008, p. 757). However, even though clearly and theoretically 
linked to conservatism, both, RWA and SDO, should not be mistaken for being synonymous 
with ideology. For example, it is possible to endorse conservative values without the general 
desire to be dominant towards an outgroup but rather because of e.g. a strong belief in equity 
and responsibility. In an analogous manner, conservatism and RWA might oftentimes but not 
always occur simultaneously. Theoretically, authoritarianism describes an “aversion to 
differences regarding space […], while conservatism reflects aversion to differences over time” 
(Everett, 2013, p. 3). While authoritarian people would therefore reject e.g. divers beliefs in 
shared space, conservatives are thought to reject the change of e.g. beliefs held by a society. 
Thus neither, RWA nor SDO, are the same as ideology and should therefore also not be used 
as measures for conservatism (Everett, 2013, p. 3).  
Instead of measuring ideology indirectly by relying on certain correlations between attitudinal 
constructs such as RWA and SDO, it’s therefore recommended to approach ideology in a 
direct fashion (Everett, 2013, p. 1-3). Such direct measures include instruments that e.g. ask 
the participant directly to indicate the ideology they feel to endorse, or that assess ideological 
beliefs through questioning their attitudes on political objects through e.g. so called “feeling 
thermometers” (Knight, 1998, p. 61-66). While there are many variations regarding the exact 
wording (Knight, 1998, p. 6), in general, ideological self-labeling, or ideological self-
identification (ISD), asks the participant a question such as “Generally speaking, would you 
consider yourself to be a liberal, a conservative, a moderate, or haven't you thought much 
about this?" (Federico, Fisher & Deason, 2012, p. 385). Possible answering formats are 
commonly either arranged in a e.g. 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative) scaling or structured 
in a way allowing less choices in the moderate spectrum with e.g. forced choice items (Knight, 
1998, p. 6).  
While the ideology assessed through self-identification is also referred to as symbolic ideology, 
beliefs that are expressed through attitudes on certain policies are summarized under the term 
20 
 
operational ideology (Ellis & Stimson, 2012, p. 11). Interestingly, while scales of both types 
are used to assess ideology on the same conservatism-liberalism spectrum, the results can 
heavily vary within an individual. Reviewing data on symbolic and operational ideology of 
American citizens, Ellis & Stimson (2012, p. 72) conclude that while the majority of Americans 
symbolically identify as conservative, they appear operationally liberal at the same time.  This 
phenomenon could possibly be due to a non-coherent concept of ideology. Indeed, data 
suggests that the concepts of ideological “left” and “right” are too abstract for the general 
citizen, indicating that operational measures might give a better understanding of an 
individual’s ideological beliefs (Bauer et al., 2017, pp. 572).  Additionally, in the US, the public 
image of “liberals” has historically been a difficult matter, associated with e.g. the race riots of 
1965 to 1968 and ideas going against the American mainstream, such as the “Acid, Amnesty, 
and Abortion” supporters in the early 1970s (Ellis & Stimson, 2012, p. 81, p. 84). Such negative 
imagery might add to a reluctance to identify as liberal in an US-American context. Thus, 
symbolical and operational ideology seem to be very different (Ellis & Stimson, 2012, p. 72), 
which should be noted and considered in research concerning ideology (Everett, 2013, pp. 2). 
Problematic in case of operational instruments are their expiration dates and validity of 
portraying attitudes distinguishing between the left and the right. Since political issues change 
with time, a conservatism scale developed in the 60s will likely have troubles to properly relate 
to contemporary conservatives. Further, such scales rely on the scientists behind the 
instrument to properly identify topics typifying ideological beliefs. Because of this, operational 
scales can give important insight on an individual’s ideology but do have to be carefully applied 
and evaluated (Everett, 2013, p. 2). 
Another possible categorization concerning ideology is the differentiation between social or 
cultural and economic ideology (Bauer et al., 2017, p. 557). While social conservatism focuses 
on social traditions, values and norms, economic conservatism refers to attitudes on the 
governmental involvement in regulating private companies and economic life of the individual.  
Following this logic, it can be possible to be economically conservative while being socially 
liberal and vice versa (Everett, 2013, p. 1). On the other hand, research has shown that the 
social and economic ideology assessed through ISD are highly intertwined, sharing a variance 
of about 50%. When concentrating on the operational measures, they shared a variance of up 
to 60%, although for individuals low in political sophistication the shared variance reached up 
to only 36% (Azevedo et al., 2019, pp. 69).  Yet, undoubtedly related, there indeed seems to 
be at least some variance between social and economic attitudes, which encourages to 





To analyze the impact measurement-methods have on results regarding asymmetries in 
ideology, the results reported by Jost (2017) concerning the nine sub-categories of epistemic 
needs were reviewed. There were few papers used by Jost (2017) that are inaccessible, e.g. 
unpublished data, missing archives of old articles. These papers are commented with source 
not found and are excluded from the categorization process as well as from the following 
analysis. If it was possible to find a paper matching with the information given by Jost (2017) 
on certain unpublished data, i.e. fitting authors and content, the paper was included and 
marked as following: author (unpublished/year).  
In a first step, the effect sizes reported by Jost (2017) were compared to the results of the 
original papers, in terms of used type of scale, whether the effect size reported by Jost (2017) 
were able to be matched with results of the cited source. Further, additionally reported 
information on correlations of the concerned psychological variable, such as e.g. dogmatism, 
and symbolic, operational, social and economic ideology was recorded. 
Reproducibility. The effect sizes reported by Jost (2017) were compared to the results 
of the indicated sources. Option NO applied to cases where no good match between source 
and Jost (2017) was formable, where the source did not report fitting correlations (no fitting 
results found) or where effect size of the original source was not reported in the correlation-
coefficient r. Option YES was marked when a match between source and Jost (2017) was 
found. Since Jost (2017) did not mention exact numbers but presented the effect sizes on 
graphs this matching process was impeded and information on the level of assurances 
included. Option VERY SURE was marked when the number deducted from Jost’s (2017) 
graphs posed a possible perfect match regarding their magnitude with the source reported 
results. Additionally, the information on significance given by Jost (2017) (significant or not 
significant) had to coincide. In cases where the significance information was not reported by 
the paper, the categorization was taken in favor of Jost (2017), assuming that the reported 
significance levels were deducted from the additional information given by the studies. The 
same applies to the by Jost (2017) reported effect sizes that were averaged. In these cases, 
the significance information reported in the chart was deducted from the significance 
information for the effect sizes that were averaged. If at least 80% were significant, the 
average was marked as significant, otherwise, they were marked as not significant (n.s.). 
However, since this is only a rough approximation to significance, if this deducted information 
differed from the significance information given by Jost (2017) it was nevertheless indicated 
as a perfect match. Option KIND OF SURE was noted when the effect sizes reported by Jost 
(2017) and results reported by the sources felt to differ only marginally and/or the significance 
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information differed. Option NOT SURE was marked when the magnitudes only roughly 
matched up, e.g. in cases where Jost’s (2017) graph clearly indicates a different magnitude 
size but the magnitude difference to the results of the source in total doesn’t seem to be too 
far off.     
Type of Scale. The scales used by Jost (2017) to assess ideology in the referred 
sources were examined. Scales were identified as being used by Jost (2017) based on 
matching effect sizes in combination with matching content, meaning the scale could have 
theoretically been used as an ideology-measure. If the study only included one measure that 
could possibly measure ideology, this scale was still categorized even in the case of the 
magnitude sizes not matching up with Jost’s (2017) or if the study did not include any 
information on a correlation of the scale and psychological variable in question. If there were 
more than one measure possible for measuring ideology but no correlation matched with 
Jost’s (2017) reported effect size, the type of scale was marked as NOT IDENTIFIABLE. This 
also applied if no possible measure of ideology was found in the cited study. The scales that 
were identifiable were categorized into six types, namely Psychological, Direct, Symbolic, 
Operational, social (Operationals) and economic (Operationale). Psychological applied to 
scales that measured ideology indirectly, i.e. taking psychological constructs, such as RWA, 
SDO or morals, as indicators for an individual’s ideology. A scale was categorized as direct, if 
ideology was measured directly, i.e. either operationally, symbolically or any combination. 
Measures of ISD were summarized under the category of symbolic, which was also the case 
if the ISD only referred to e.g. social ideology. Operational measures included an array of 
instruments assessing political attitudes. These could be identified in the form of e.g. political 
beliefs questionnaires, conservatism scales such as the C scale (Wilson-Patterson, 1968) but 
also in the form of external ratings. For example, Tetlock et al. (1984, p. 982) used valuations 
by the political organization Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) of senatorial voting 
records to identify the ideological beliefs of senators. Usually, voting is only indirectly 
influenced by ideology and cannot be entirely explained by it (Jacoby, 2009, p. 591; Holm & 
Robinson, 1978, p. 238). However, in case of the politically sophisticated, to which the political 
elite belongs (Lupton, Myers & Thornton, 2015, p. 373), it was shown that voting is highly 
ideology consistent (Knight, 1985, pp. 849; Levitt, 1996, p. 434). Based on these 
circumstances, the ADA ratings of senatorial voting records were included as an operational 
measure of ideology, assuming that these votes effectively mirrored the senators’ evaluation 
of the given political objects. Furthermore, party affiliation was usually not regarded as an 
ideological measure, as they certainly are bound to be related to a certain degree but are not 
entirely dependent on each other (Holm & Robinson, 1978, pp. 241; Barber & Pope, 2019, p. 
43; Lupton, Smallpage & Enders, 2020, p. 246). However, in case that party affiliation was 
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incorporated with ideological measurements to an index, the results were still incorporated. 
This decision was based on the assumption that the variable on party affiliation would not 
distort the indication of ideological belonging obtained through the other measures of the index 
too heavily. Support for this decision can be drawn from research regarding the relationship 
of political affiliation and symbolic as well as operational ideology. As for symbolic ideology, 
political affiliation is indeed intertwined with ideological self-identification and data suggests 
that this trend is further getting stronger with time (Twenge et al., 2016, p. 1377). In case of 
operational ideology, party affiliation has been shown to significantly impact policy preferences 
(Carsey & Layman, 2006, p. 474), indicating a stable connection between one’s party 
preferences and one’s evaluation of policies. Therefore, albeit not the same, when combined 
into an index with ideological measures, ideology and party preferences should not intervene 
with each other heavily enough to render such index ineffective for probing ideological beliefs. 
Some scales specifically concentrated on economic or social attitudes to assess ideology, 
such as the Middendorp Cultural conservatism scale (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009, p. 297; Crowson, 
2009, pp. 454). These cases were categorized accordingly as either Operationals in case of a 
social focus and Operationale if only economic ideology was assessed. Only operational 
scales were categorized as gauging social or economic ideology. Therefore, if participants 
were asked to self-identify regarding social or economic ideology, the instrument was 
classified as symbolic. When different types of scales were combined, e.g. in form of indices 
or formed averages of multiple scales, the according scales used are listed together.   
Magnitude size reported by Jost. If the results reported by Jost (2017) and the found 
results from the original source did not seem to match up perfectly, the magnitude size 
reported by Jost (2017), including the information on significance, was approximately noted. 
In case that the significance level was not marked in the original source, the significance level 
reported by Jost (2017) was commented. All magnitude sizes are, in line with the original 
graphs by Jost (2017), reported in measures of r (Pearson’s correlation coefficient).  
Magnitude size reported by source paper. The correlations between the psychological 
variable in question and by Jost (2017) used scale are reported in r. If the paper provided 
information on the significance of these correlations, they were indicated. In case the paper 
did not indicate information regarding the significance of the correlation, the reported effect 
size is followed by significance information not found. Only effect sizes reported in r were 
included. If alternative coefficients were used, reported size not r is commented. Some cases 
indicated zero-order as well as partial correlations. Here, only zero-order correlations were 
reported, as these are better comparable with the others samples. If the paper did not include 
correlations on the variables in question, no fitting results found is marked. In some cases, the 
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reported effect size by Jost (2017) is an average taken of multiple correlations. These effect 
sizes were marked using square brackets.  
Additional magnitude sizes given by source samples. The reported source samples 
were checked on additional information concerning correlations of the target variable (e.g. 
dogmatism) and ideological measures apart from the scale used by Jost (2017). If such 
additional correlations of operational, symbolic, economic and symbolic ideology and the 
target variable were reported in r, the effect sizes were noted accordingly, including 
information on significance and exact type of scale. Since measures that assess ideology 
indirectly with the help of psychological constructs such as e.g. RWA have been shown to be 
not fit to measure an individual’s ideology (Everett, 2013, p. 3), no additional information was 
collected on according correlations. The categorization was conducted following the same 
pattern as the classification of the scale used by Jost (2017). If information on liberalism and 
conservatism was assessed separately for one type of ideological measure, the correlation 
coefficients were averaged, as this would have happened during the second step anyway. 
The full categorization can be found in the appendix, Table 1. 
In a second step, average effect sizes were calculated in a multiple-step procedure based on 
the formerly obtained findings for each of the nine psychological variables connected to 
epistemic needs featured in Jost’s (2017) meta-analysis. First, averages were calculated for 
cases categorized as very surely reproducible, followed by averages that combined cases 
categorized as kind of surely and not surely reproducible. In case of the kind of surely and not 
surely reproducible effect sizes, instead of relying on the information indicated by Jost (2017), 
only verifiable data, i.e. the data taken from the source samples, was included. This ensures 
that the categorizations of the scales in these cases are valid. Further, averages of the non-
reproducible results and averages of the additional information given by the source samples 
were calculated. Second, combined averages were formed, adding and averaging the four 
separate average sizes until an average effect size that contains all assessed information is 
calculated.  
This process was separately conducted four times in each psychological variable, separating 
information on the dimensions psychological versus direct, symbolic versus operational and 
economic versus social types of measures. However, as symbolic and operational measures 
belong to direct measures and social and economic ideology can only be identified 
operationally, instead of allotting results exclusively to one average dimension, the data was 
rather thinned out. In other words, effect sizes e.g. obtained through economic measures were 
also included in the averages of operational and direct measures but not vice versa. Yet, if a 
result was identified to stem from unrelated types of scales simultaneously, e.g. symbolic and 
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psychological, the results were excluded from all these analyzing dimensions, except for the 
following. In addition to the mentioned averages, a combinational average effect size of all 
types was assessed as well. This allowed, on one hand, to try reproducing Jost’s (2017) 
results, and on the other hand, to have a basis for estimating the impact of different 
measurement types on found asymmetries in ideologies. Because of the aim to reproduce 
Jost’s (2017) results in comparison to the psychological-direct, the operational-symbolic and 
the social-economic averages, the average of the total combinational average was built up 
with minimal difference. While in the former cases, the additional data collected from the 
source samples directly followed the very likely reproducible average, in the latter total 
combination average these sizes were fused in last. However, this process would not allow 
the calculation of an average made up of entirely verified effect sizes for the other 
combinational averages. Hence, this process was not adapted to all cases. Information on 
significance was added up and recorded, but since the information was not obtainable in many 
cases, final significance levels of the averages were not estimated. For the results reported 
by Jost (2017) that represented averages, the self-estimated significance information was 
recorded. 
Since there were very few data concerning correlations of social or economic ideology and 
the featured psychological variables, an average combining all effect sizes across was 
calculated. Even though the specification toward specific variables was thereby lost, at least 
an overall impact of the social and the economic dimension on asymmetries in ideologies was 
deducible. To have a base for such a comparison, an average of the general asymmetries in 
ideologies including all types of measures was additionally calculated. However, as the 
measures for conservative ideology related to some featured variables positively and to others 
negatively, taking an average as such would be distorted. Therefore, adjusted averages were 
additionally calculated, in which all algebraic signs of its components were switched. This 
applied to the results of cognitive reflection, need for cognition, integrative complexity and 
tolerance of uncertainties. 
Five studies were excluded from all analyses, even though the effect sizes reported by Jost 
(2017) and the source sample appeared to match. However, in these samples, the measures 
that seemed to be used by Jost (2017) to assess ideology were not categorizable into the 
scale-types of interest. Specifically, this decision affected indications of voting behavior in 
elections (Chirumbolo et al., 2004, p. 249), measures of political open-mindedness (Price et 
al., 2015, p. 1497), the Authoritarianism Rebellion Scale (Kohn, 1974, p. 249), the form 60 of 
the Levinson-Sanford scale (Levinson & Sanford, 1944; used by Barron, 1953, p. 168) and 
the membership to student political organizations (Kohn, 1974, p. 253). While voting behavior 
is empirically indeed impacted by ideology, it is usually not directly reflecting ideological beliefs 
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(Smith, 1999, p. 40; Jacoby, 2009, p. 591) and was therefore excluded as an ideological 
measure, the exemption being the ADA ratings mentioned above. The political open-
mindedness focused was taken out from the analyses since its focus lied on the endorsement 
of tolerance rather than of certain attitudes (Price et al., 2015, p. 1489). The Authoritarianism 
Rebellion Scale was excluded from the analyses as it supposedly is an authoritarian measure 
void of a conservatism hinge (Kohn, 1974, p. 245) and the form 60 of the Levinson-Sanford 
scale was not classifiable in the given context as it is a measure of anti-Semitism, not ideology 
(Barron, 1953, p. 172). Finally, the membership of a political student organization was not 
deemed sufficient as an indicator of ideology. 
4.3 Results 
With nine sources being undiscoverable, 217 samples reported by Jost (2017) were evaluated. 
From the source samples, additionally 84 effect sizes were acquired, adding up to 301 sizes 
that were looked at. Six correlations were excluded from the analyses, as their ideology-
measure did not fulfill the requirements, leaving a total of 295 effect sizes being analyzed.  
Splitting up the sample according to the analyses’ steps proved to greatly reduce some of the 
sample sizes, preventing meaningful comparisons. So, the focus was laid on averages that 
combined surely, kind of surely and not surely reproducible data, as well as not reproducible 
results in addition to the effect sizes additionally given by the source samples. For the cases 
marked not reproducible because the effect sizes found in the sources did not match with the 
size reported by Jost (2017), the source sizes were considered in the calculations. Therefore, 
the inclusion of this category should not have distorted the results effectively. The same 
applies to the cases that were marked as not reproducible because the original source did not 
report the concerning relation in r. Since such sizes were only included in the analyses 
differentiating scale types if the original source only gave one specific measure possibly 
measuring ideology, the decision to include these magnitude sizes should not distort the 
concerning results, here as well. A full report of all separate averages can be found in the 
appendix, Table 3 – Table 6. 
In the first set of analyses, the unweighted average effect sizes reported by Jost (2017) were 
compared to (1) the combinational averages including reproducible and not reproducible 
results deducted from the original source samples and (2) to the combinational averages 
including all deducible information from the original source samples, including the additionally 
found data (see Figure 2). On one hand, this allowed trying to reproduce the finding of Jost 
(2017) and on the other hand established a basis for comparison regarding the following 
averages that include the additionally obtained information. The unweighted average effect 
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sizes were chosen for comparison as the averages calculated for this thesis are unweighted 
as well, and therefore less comparable to weighted averages. 
Jost’s (2017) averages on epistemic needs were only reproducible in three cases and were 
fairly close in additionally two cases. In the cases where Jost’s (2017) averages were not 
exactly reproducible, in four out of six cases, the average excluding the additional data derived 
from the original sources was closer to the reported averages by Jost (2017). Looking at both 
combinational averages including reproducible and not reproducible results deducted from the 
original source samples and the combinational averages including all deducible information 
form the original source samples including the additionally deducted date, Jost’s (2017) results 
were fairly well reproducible. The averages never deviated more than r = .10 from each other 
and in nearly 89 % they strayed r ≤ .05.  Including all concerning information deducible from 
the sources cited by Jost (2017), the largest average effect size remained being observed for 
dogmatism (r(61) = .41 (.04 < r < .82), significant (s.): 29, n.s.: 6, significance information not 
found (n.f.): 26).  
 
Figure 2. Unweighted average effect sizes for studies investigating hypotheses that political ideology 
is associated with epistemic needs in comparison with combinational averages deduced from the 
source samples.  marks averages reported by Jost (2017);  marks combinational averages of surely 
reproducible, maybe reproducible, not surely reproducible and not reproducible effect sizes;  marks 
combinational averages of surely reproducible, maybe reproducible, not surely reproducible, not 
reproducible effect sizes and additional information from source samples; PNOS: personal needs for 
order and structure; CP rigidity: cognitive and perceptual rigidity 
Source. This figure was modeled based on the reported effect sizes and additional results from the 
sources cited by Jost (2017). 
 
Following, the average effect sizes observed for cognitive and perceptual rigidity (r(18) = .31 
(-.06 < r < .76), s.: 5, n.s.: 6, n.f.: 7) and for tolerance of uncertainties (r(12)= -.30 (-.58 < r 
< .09), s.: 10, n.s.: 1, n.f.: 1) were similarly high. Average effect sizes around r = .20 were 
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observed in case of personal needs for order and structure (r(34) = .24 (-.06 < r < .55), s.: 23, 
n.s.: 9, n.f.: 2), need for cognitive closure (r(61) = .22 (-.30 < r < .61), s.: 49, n.s.: 8, n.f.: 4) and 
intolerance of ambiguity (r(30) = .21 (-.075 < r < .59), s.: 20, n.s. 7, n.f.: 3). The smallest 
average effect size was observed for integrative complexity (r(26) = .10 (-.50 < r < .19), s.: 8, 
n.s.: 15, n.f.: 3), preceded by cognitive reflection (r(28) = -.12 (-.29 < r < .07), s.: 14, n.s.: 14) 
and need for cognition (r(25) = -.14 (-.34 < r < .02), s.: 15, n.s.: 9, n.f.: 1). In five out of nine 
psychological variables, the significant cases clearly outweigh the non-significant ones, clearly 
supporting the hypothesis of ideological asymmetries. Yet, in case of cognitive and perceptual 
rigidity and dogmatism, the results are not as clearly backing up the assumption of 
asymmetries, with the significance information for a deciding amount of cases not found. 
Furthermore, for cognitive reflection, the hypothesis was as often supported as it was not. 
While in case of integrative complexity, the non-significant cases actually outweighed the 
significant ones. 20 cases were categorized as stemming from direct as well as psychological 
measures and were thus not included into the following sets of analyses. For a full disclosure 
of the categorizations and effect sizes, see Table 1 in the appendix. 
Figure 3. Average effect sizes for studies investigating hypotheses that political ideology is associated 
with epistemic needs divided into effect sizes measured with psychological and direct measures.  
marks overall average effect sizes deducible from source samples;  marks average effect sizes 
measured with psychological measures;  marks average effect sizes measured with direct measures; 
PNOS: personal needs for order and structure; CP rigidity: cognitive and perceptual rigidity 
Source. This figure was modeled based on the reported effect sizes and additional results from the 
sources cited by Jost (2017). 
 
In a second set of analyses, the impact of psychological versus direct measures was examined 
(see Figure 3). Overall, 58 cases stemmed from psychological measures and 195 cases were 
measured with direct measures. Except for tolerance of uncertainties, every psychological 
variable was measured with psychological as well as with direct scales. As expected, the 
resulted averages did indeed vary between the measures, with deviations up to r = .35. On 
the other hand, there are also cases where the results only marginally differed from each other, 
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with e.g. psychologically and directly measured averages only differing r = .03 from each other 
in case of integrative complexity.  
With a difference of r = .35, the biggest deviation between indirect and direct measures 
occurred for dogmatism (rpsychological(22) = .63 (.10 < r < .82), s.: 4, n.s.: 1, n.f.: 17;             
(rdirect(29) = .28 (.04 < r < .58), s.: 18, n.s.: 3, n.f.: 8). Following, indirectly and directly assessed 
correlations of ideology with need for cognitive closure (rpsychological(3) = .39 (.27 < r < .61), s.: 
3; rdirect(47) = 0.20 (-.30 < r < .56), s.: 38, n.s.: 7, n.f.: 2) variated r = .19. The smallest variations 
were observed for cognitive and perceptual rigidity (rpsychological(8) = .28 (-.06 < r < .76), s.: 4, 
n.s.: 2, n.f.: 2; rdirect(7) = .32 (.13 < r < .56), s.: 1, n.s.: 2, n.f.: 4), personal needs for order and 
structure (rpsychological(6) = .26 (.11 < r < .35), s.: 3, n.s.: 1, n.f.: 2; rdirect(22) = .22 (-.06 < r < .55), 
s.: 16, n.s.: 6) and integrative complexity (rpsychological(6) = -.12 (-.20 < r < -.02), n.s.: 3, n.f.: 3; 
rdirect(20) = -.15 (-.50 < r < .19), s.: 8, n.s.: 12).  
Regarding the significance information, once again, there are cases where determining weight 
lies in the cases for which the concerning information is not found. In the remaining cases, the 
majority of the averages contain more significant cases than not. However, four cases where 
the majority of the averages are made up of majorly non-significant results were observed. 
Three of these cases are averages of direct measures and for integrative complexity, both 
averages turned out to be dominantly non-significant. Overall, the psychological and direct 
averages differed around r(8) = .12 (.35 < r < .03) from each other. Except for the cases of 
integrative complexity and personal needs for order and structure, the psychological measures’ 
average effect sizes deviated more from the overall averages than did the directly measured. 
This however might also be due to the more than doubled sample size of direct measures 
compared to the psychological ones. Interestingly, the overall averages usually lie in between 
the averages observed for psychological and direct measures, indicating that the type of 
measure does indeed pull the results to different directions.  
Additionally, out of the existing eight pairs of psychological and direct averages, in five cases, 
the average effect sizes stemming from direct measures were smaller in magnitude than the 
ones stemming from psychological measures.  
The third set of analyses examined the impact of operational versus symbolic measures of 
ideology on psychological predispositions (see Figure 4). Overall, 80 cases stemmed from 
symbolic measures and 103 cases were measured with operational measures. All 
psychological variables were correlated with ideology assessed with symbolic as well as 
ideology measured with operational scales. Again, the resulted averages did indeed vary 
between the measures, deviating up to r = .28. However, this time, there were also results that 
did not differ from each other when measured with different scale-types. This was the case for 
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tolerance of uncertainties (rsymbolic(2) = -.21 (-.39 < r < -.03), s.: 2; roperational(6) = -.21 (-.45 < r < 
-.09), s.: 5, n.s.: 1) and personal needs for order and structure (rsymbolic(8) = .23 (.13 < r < .29), 
s.: 8; roperational(13) = .23 (-.06 < r < .55), s.: 8, n.s.: 5). Again, some results differed only 
marginally between measures, e.g. the averages of need for cognitive closure only deviated r 
= .01. The biggest deviation between symbolic and operational measures occurred for 
cognitive and perceptual rigidities (rsymbolic(3) = .20 (.13 < r < .35), s.: 1, n.s.: 2; roperational(3) = .48 
(.35 < r < .56), s.: 2, n.f.: 1). Following, averages of symbolic and direct measures variated r 
= .13 in case of integrative complexity (rsymbolic(5) = -.06 (-.29 < r < .19), s.: 2, n.s.: 3; 
roperational(14) = -.19 (-.50 < r < .16), s.: 6, n.s.: 8). The smallest variations were observed in 
case of need for cognition (rsymbolic(9) = -.14 (-.27 < r < .02), s.: 6, n.s.: 3; roperational(8) = -.10 (-.23 
< r < -.01), s.: 4, n.s.: 4) and need for cognitive closure (rsymbolic(26) = .20 (-.03 < r < .38), s.: 20, 
n.s.: 5, n.f.: 1; roperational(21) = .21 (-.01 < r < .56), s.: 18, n.s.: 2, n.f.: 1).  
 
Figure 4. Average effect sizes for studies investigating hypotheses that political ideology is associated 
with epistemic needs divided into effect sizes measured with symbolic and operational measures.  
marks overall average effect sizes deducible from source samples;  marks average effect sizes 
measured with symbolic measures;  marks average effect sizes measured with operational measures; 
PNOS: personal needs for order and structure; CP rigidity: cognitive and perceptual rigidity 
Source. This figure was modeled based on the reported effect sizes and additional results from the 
sources cited by Jost (2017). 
 
Regarding the significance information, this time, only one average had a deciding amount of 
cases for which the concerning information was not found. From the remaining averages, ten 
are predominantly made up of significant results and six are predominantly made up of non-
significant results. These six cases apply to symbolic and operational averages equally. On 
average, the symbolic and operational averages deviated around r(9) = .07 (0 < r < .28). 
Except for need for cognition, all symbolic and operational measures differed from the overall 
average. This time, no particular measuring type was observed to be generally closer to the 
overall averages than the other. The same applies to their positioning. In the cases of cognitive 
rigidity, tolerance of ambiguity and integrative complexity, the averages stemming from 
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symbolic and operational averages place in opposite directions in comparison to the overall 
averages, while in four cases, both averages are positioned further to zero than the overall 
averages. For uncertainty tolerance and personal need for structure, the operationally 
measured average effect sizes coincided with the overall averages, but the symbolic average 
is again positioned closer to zero. The symbolical average being closer to zero applied to five 
cases, while for uncertainty tolerance and personal need for structure, the symbolic and 
operational averages were equal. Thus, averages of operationally measured results were 
smaller in magnitude size in comparison to the symbolically measured averages only twice.  
 
Figure 5. Average effect sizes for studies investigating hypotheses that political ideology is associated 
with epistemic needs, separately observing economic and social ideology.  marks overall average 
effect sizes deducible from source samples;  marks average effect sizes measured with economic 
measures;  marks average effect sizes measured with social measures; PNOS: personal needs for 
order and structure; CP rigidity: cognitive and perceptual rigidity  
Source. This figure was modeled based on the reported effect sizes and additional results from the 
sources cited by Jost (2017). 
 
In the fourth set of analyses, the impact of economic ideology versus social ideology was 
examined (see Figure 5). Overall, 28 cases measuring economic ideology and 20 cases of 
social ideology were assessed. All except one psychological variable were correlated at least 
once with economic and social ideology. Even though the representativeness of this set of 
analyses is heavily impaired due to the small sample sizes, the deviations here are quite 
interesting. With averages deviating up to r = .36, in comparison to the other measures, social 
and economic ideology differed on average the most with around r(8) = .19 (0 < r < .36). Only 
in case of integrative complexity, economic and social ideology correlated equally with the 
psychological predisposition (reconomic(3) = -.09 (-.22 < r < .06), n.s.: 3; rsocial(2) = -.09 (-.11 < r 
< -.06), n.s.: 2). Additionally, the average effect sizes for social and economic ideology only 
slightly deviated in case of cognitive reflection (reconomic(6) = -.04 (-.09< r < .07), s.: 1, n.s.: 5; 
rsocial(2) = -.08 (-.16 < r < -.01), s.: 1, n.s.: 1).  
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The biggest difference in average effect sizes between social and economic ideology was 
observed in case of personal needs for order and structure (reconomic(3) = .03 (-.06 < r < .16), 
n.s.: 3; rsocial(4) = .39 (.18 < r < .55), s.: 4).  For tolerance of uncertainties, the values observed 
also varied to a large extend (reconomic = .09, s.: 1; rsocial = -.26, s.: 1). However, only one result 
per category was recorded and hence no average was calculated. As the overall sample size 
was quite small to begin with, the information on significance is unsurprisingly relatively low, 
too. While most of the averages are stemming from more significant results than from non-
significant, there are cases like dogmatism, where the information on significance are in the 
majority of cases not found, as well. Additionally, five averages contained predominantly non-
significant results, of which four are correlations with economic ideology. However, as already 
mentioned, the sample size is quite small, leading to many averages being made up of only 
four or less cases. Average correlations of social and economic ideology differed from the 
overall average in all cases and except for integrative complexity (reconomic(3) = -.09 (-.22 < r 
< .06), n.s.: 3; rsocial(2) = -.09 (-.11 < r < -.06), n.s.: 2) deviated from each other as well. Except 
for the averages in case of integrative complexity, where social and economic ideology 
correlated identically and in case of cognitive and perceptual rigidity, where social ideology 
was not measured, all average magnitude sizes were smaller for economic ideology compared 
to social ideology. Further, not only were the average effect sizes for economic ideology 
smaller, cognitive closure was in fact on average negatively correlated with economic 
conservatism (reconomic(4) = -.01 (-.30 < r < .22), s.: 4), opposite to the hypothesized direction. 
In addition, the overall averages were also generally closer to the averages of social ideology. 
This indicates that in regard of asymmetries in ideology, social ideology might indeed correlate 
differently to psychological predispositions than economic ideology does.  
 
Figure 6. Average effect size for studies investigating hypotheses that political ideology is associated 
with epistemic needs, related to separate observations of economic and social ideology.  marks 
overall average effect size deducible from source samples;  marks average effect size measured with 
economic measures;  marks average effect size measured with social measures 
Source. This figure was modeled based on the reported effect sizes and additional results from the 
sources cited by Jost (2017). 
 
This assumption is further supported by the final set of analyses that examined economic and 
social ideology in correlation with psychological predispositions on a more general level. This 
was achieved by combining all the separate averages on economic and social ideology and 
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comparing them to an average on all deducible information regarding correlations of ideology 
and the featured psychological variables (see Figure 6).  
Comparing all the 48 correlations of the featured variables related to epistemic needs and 
economic and social ideology, the indications for economic and social ideology relating 
differently to psychological predispositions further grow. Even though in general, both are 
correlated in the hypothesized direction to the featured psychological variables, the average 
magnitude sizes deviated r = .21 from each other. Again, the average based on social ideology 
(rsocial(20) = .30 (.01 < r < .55), s.: 17, n.s.: 3) was positioned closer to the overall average 
(r(295) = .25 (-.58 < r < .82), s.: 173, n.s.: 75, n.f.: 47) than the economic ideology’s (reconomic(28) 
= .09 (-.30 < r < .35), s.: 9, n.s.: 13, n.f.: 6) and the asymmetries were smaller in their magnitude 
for economic ideology, as well. These differences are also portrayed in their information on 
significance. While the averaged correlation with social ideology is predominantly stemming 
from significant results, overall, the averaged correlation with economic ideology does not 
support the hypothesized asymmetries as clearly when focusing on the information regarding 
significance. The average effect sizes of economic ideology were predominantly featuring 
non-significant results and cases for which the information on significance was not found.  
4.4 Discussion 
The first goal of reproducing Jost’s (2017) results was moderately well achieved. Even though 
a perfect match was only achieved for need for cognitive closure, need for cognition and 
cognitive reflection, around 89% of the reevaluated data deviated only r ≤ .05 from the results 
reported by Jost (2017). Considering that not all samples used by Jost (2017) were able to be 
found and thus excluded from the analysis, a perfect match was unlikely to be achievable from 
the beginning. However, in comparison to the magnitude sizes, the information regarding 
significance was not as well reproducible, with many results for which the concerning 
information was not directly obtainable from the cited source (see appendix, Table 1). Yet, this 
should not be interpreted as indicating that ideology is not related to the featured variables, as 
the method used to assess significance in this thesis is rudimentary at best and should not be 
taken as allowing more than a first insight. This should be kept in mind for all the information 
on significance referred to by this thesis. 
The second goal of the thesis was to see whether measurement-methods have an impact on 
the resulted asymmetries. The quality of science is determined by its success to define and 
measure the targeted concept precisely. In context of social sciences, this poses some 
difficulties, as the investigated constructs are usually not directly observable (Flake & Fried, 
2019, p. 3). Regarding ideology, there have been many approaches to define and measure its 
characteristics, endorsement and implications for an individual’s behavior (Jost, Fitzsimons & 
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Kay, 2004, pp. 264; Heywood, 2017, pp. 8; Everett, 2013, pp. 2; Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009, 
pp.323). Following this tradition, Jost (2017) included in his meta-analyses results regarding 
the relationship of psychological predispositions and ideology that stemmed from diverse 
measures (see appendix Table 2).  On the upside, such a multi-method approach ensures a 
certain degree of validity, as discriminant validity statistically requires the construct being 
assessed with more than one measure (Schimmack, 2019, p. 9). However, to achieve validity, 
it also has to be ensured that the various instruments used do in fact measure the investigated 
construct (Flake & Fried, 2019, p. 3). Yet, correlations between the measures are not sufficient 
to ensure a relation of the instrument based on the examined construct (Schimmack, 2019, p. 
7). Thus, on the downside, diverse approaches to one concept could also potentially heighten 
the danger of measuring variables beyond the targeted construct.  
From the perspective of construct validity, the inclusion of instruments assessing ideology 
indirectly, through constructs such as RWA and SDO by Jost (2017) has to be evaluated as 
critical at least (see Everett, 2013, p. 3). However, even though the direct and indirect 
averages differed on average around r(8) = .12 (.35 < r < .03), the hypothesized asymmetries 
were still observable when excluding the indirectly measured results. Yet, in more than half of 
the cases a comparison between direct and indirect measures was achievable, the magnitude 
sizes observed for the direct measures were smaller, indicating that Jost’s (2017) results were 
possibly overestimating the connection of ideology with the featured psychological variables. 
Interestingly, some variables seemed to be more impacted by excluding indirect measures 
than others. For example, the measured averages only deviated r = .03 from each other for 
integrative complexity. This might be due to similar processes underlying ideological 
preferences as well as variables such as RWA that produce similar results especially in case 
of integrative complexity. A possible explanation could be that the tendency to perceive the 
world as a dangerous one connected to RWA (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009, p. 299) leads to a 
tendency to averse diverse perspectives in their argumentation similar to what the desire to 
maintain current conditions driven conservative spectrum of ideology induces (Jost, Federico 
& Napier, p. 310). From this perspective, individuals high in RWA might be similarly inclined 
to focus on one perspective in their argumentation as individuals endorsing conservatism are 
but for different reasons. While individuals high in RWA would reject pluralist arguments as a 
defense mechanism against perceived danger from the very fact that they are divers, 
conservatives would averse such argumentation out of the desire to simply keep conditions 
as they currently are. In this sense, both RWA and conservatism could be related to the same 
variable, but not because they represent the same construct (also see Everett, 2013, p. 3). 
The results from this second set of analyses support a variation between indirect and direct 
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measures for ideology, indicating that here, even though seemingly sharing similarities, indeed 
different constructs seem to be measured.  
In addition, research and theoretical considerations that indicate differences between social 
and economic as well as between symbolic and operational ideology (Everett, 2013, p. 1; Ellis 
& Stimson, 2012, p. 72) encourage a deeper look into the measures used by Jost (2017). This 
applies especially to the measure’s relations to psychological predispositions precedingly 
characterized as differentiating between individuals endorsing different ideological beliefs on 
a liberalism-conservatism spectrum (Jost, 2017, p. 167). As expected, results measured with 
symbolic and operational measures of ideology did on average deviate from each other. 
Surprisingly, this was not the case for tolerance of uncertainties as well as for personal needs 
for order and structure. This could be interpreted as either symbolic and operational ideology 
not being completely different constructs, or as indicating that these variables relate to both 
constructs independently equally well. However, in context of the remaining results of the 
analyses and aggregated data that does support the assumption of differences between 
operational and symbolic ideology (Ellis & Stimson, 2012, p. 72), the second interpretive 
approach seems more accurate. A third possibility is that the results of the analyses are 
tapping into but only approximately portraying the true relationships of symbolic versus 
operational ideology and the featured variables. Keeping in mind that the sample sizes 
especially in these cases ranged in between two to thirteen, this case seems to be very likely 
and should at least be considered when trying to interpret the results. Overall, in comparison 
with symbolic ideology, there was a tendency for operational measures to relate more strongly 
to the featured psychological variables. In other words, the featured epistemic motives seem 
to better relate to operational ideology, i.e. policy preferences, compared to symbolic ideology. 
Bearing in mind that symbolic ideology has been shown to rather act as a social identity 
(Barber & Pope, 2019, p.53), this connection doesn’t seem too surprising. After all, while 
especially social identity is additionally influenced by factors such as social networks or life-
changing experiences (Ng et al., 2018, p. 172, pp. 181), with epistemic motivation shaping 
information processing (Jost & Krochik, 2014, p. 183) its relationship to forming policy 
preferences seems to be more direct.  
However, the tendency for one measuring type to relate more strongly to the psychological 
predispositions doesn’t manifest as strongly as in the previous set of analyses. This could be 
due to the sample size being considerably smaller in the symbolic-operational analyses or 
could be based on a distortion of the results due to conflicting subcategories. Here, economic 
and social ideology could pose such conflicting subcategories for operational ideology (see 
Perry & Sibley, 2013, p. 264). This consideration seems to be supported by the acquired data. 
While in case of integrative complexity, economic and social ideology correlated equally, these 
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measures deviated with on average r(8) = .19 (0 < r < .36)., compared to the other sets of 
analyses, the most from each other. In comparison to social ideology, economic ideology 
seemed to relate less to epistemic motives. Interestingly, for economic ideology, one 
psychological variable was observed to relate oppositely to the hypothesized direction, 
indicating that economic conservatism is in fact, even though only slightly, related to lowered 
need for cognitive closure. Because the sample sizes for this set of analyses were 
considerably smaller than the other sets, both measures were additionally examined in a 
combined context, revealing similar results on a more general level of asymmetric epistemic 
motivation in ideologies. Again, social ideology seemed to relate considerably more to the 
featured psychological variables than economic ideology. This difference even carries through 
to the information on significance, with social ideology producing mostly significant and 
economic ideology mostly non-significant results and cases for which concerning information 
was not found. Johnson and Tamney (2001, p. 236) proposed that individuals who endorse 
social conservative beliefs might feel their beliefs to be more endangered in the modern world 
than individuals endorsing conservative economic beliefs since these are better integrated into 
the progressive and complex present. Additionally, they suggest that economic conservative 
beliefs should especially well attract the wealthy as they e.g. feature lowered taxes, less 
governmental participation in private business and higher requirements for access to social 
welfare (Johnson & Tamney, 2001, pp. 233). Taking this into consideration, economic 
conservatism could relate to people differently in terms of offered security, depending on their 
economic standing. Possibly, for the citizen who does not belong to the “wealthy”, economic 
conservatism could actually mean less security, leading to economic liberalism better 
satisfying such needs. Therefore, the link between epistemic needs and economic 
conservatism could be weaker and possibly even opposite to social conservatism, because it 
would depend on an individual’s income as to whether it answers the needs of security or not.  
The key strength of this thesis is its detailed approach to the measures used to assess 
ideology. However, naturally, it also has limitations that restrict the conclusions that can be 
drawn from the findings. The most obvious of these is its sample size. As this work’s goal was 
to reevaluate the findings reported by Jost (2017), the sample size was restricted to the 
selection previously done by Jost, Sterling and Stern (2018). This potentially means a 
systematic distortion based on applied categorization. Further, even though the sample size 
was adequate for the initial analyses done by Jost (2017), splitting the samples according to 
their scale-types did reduce them considerably. In some cases, this reduction led to averages 
being taken from samples only consisting of two data points, which may not be ideal to draw 
a statistical value. Hence, the analyses conducted can only tap into but not well represent the 
impact measurements of ideology have in the context of asymmetrical epistemic needs. 
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Furthermore, results were only included into the analyses if they were reported in r by the 
source samples. This not only limited the information regarding certain results reported by Jost 
but also restricted the acquiring of additional information from the source samples. Additionally, 
another problem rises from the exclusive attention towards measures of ideology. However, 
the measures of the epistemic needs were not further examined, leaving the question of their 
validity and impact on the results. Yet, trusting that the initial selection by Jost, Sterling & Stern 
(2018) did only include cases of where the epistemic needs in question were adequately 
measured, this should not pose too big of an issue. Another limitation stems from the 
presentation format chosen by Jost (2017). Because the effect sizes are presented in a graph, 
a perfect comparison between the results of the sources and the reported was not possible 
and the choices regarding match in magnitude sizes had to be based on feelings. Also 
problematic were the calls on significance, as for one many source samples did not give the 
necessary information and the method used to determine whether a taken average was 
significant or not is rudimentary at best. Further, the source samples were not cross-checked 
for additional information on other epistemic needs apart from the one it was used for by Jost 
(2017). In other words, samples of which results were reported for dogmatism by Jost (2017) 
were not searched for additional information on the relation of ideology and e.g. needs for 
order and structure. However, as Jost (2017) did use the same samples for multiple epistemic 
needs, this shouldn’t have overly distorted the results. Finally, the general limitations of meta-
analyses apply, such as difficulties in replicating findings of other meta-analyses and 
unstandardized meta-analytic methods (Schulze, 2004, pp. 191).  
Still, the findings of this thesis encourage further research in the field of asymmetrical 
epistemic needs in ideology with greater care to the used measurements, especially in regard 
to economic ideology. Minding the known differences between symbolic and operational 
ideology (Barber & Pope, 2019, p.53; Ellis & Stimson, 2012, p. 72), here too, the findings urge 
for a better differentiation. This not only includes more awareness regarding measures but 
also more attention on theoretical distinctions and implications. Furthermore, it would be 
interesting to examine the impact of a more differentiated approach to ideology not only in 
context of epistemic needs but also in connection with existential and relational needs. As to 
whether such a differentiated approach to ideology would be able to explain the contradictory 
results of existing meta-analyses cannot be answered with the current findings. However, the 
results of this thesis do encourage further research in this direction.  
5. Conclusions 
One key issue in research concerning ideology has been the question of what draws an 
individual to a certain ideology (Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009, pp. 313). In his presidential 
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address, Jost (2017) summarized the work on asymmetries in ideologies and amongst them, 
results concerning differences in epistemic needs. While a multi-method approach is central 
for validity (Schimmack, 2019, p. 9), such approach requires the used methods to be valid 
measures of the construct in question (see Schimmack, 2019, p. 3). In five sets of analyses, 
Jost’s (2017) results were reevaluated in regard to their reproducibility and used measures of 
ideology. Collectively, the general direction indicated by the results reported by Jost (2017) 
was reproducible, even after removing results stemming from scales that are not measuring 
ideology, such as scales assessing e.g. RWA. The inclusion of such non-direct measures by 
Jost (2017) might have over-estimated the effect sizes, however, in most cases, the 
hypothesis of asymmetrical epistemic needs in ideologies was supported across all measures.  
Yet, the overall findings support a more detailed differentiation on measures of ideology in 
regard to asymmetric psychological predispositions, with averages of different measures only 
coinciding in three cases and deviating r ≥ .05 in 16 out of 25 cases. Especially for social and 
economic ideology, epistemic needs seemed to relate differently, with the overall direction of 
averages being as expected for both but considerably varying in magnitude size. 
Validation has been shown to be a major challenge in today’s social sciences (Schimmack, 
2009, p. 3; Flake & Fried, 2019, pp. 3). The findings of this thesis indicate that such challenge 
is also present in the current research regarding asymmetries in ideologies. While a multi-
method approach is encouraged to assess constructs (Schimmack, 2009, p. 3), taking a step 
back and reevaluating each used measure should not be forgotten. Implementing such care 
and attention towards measures of ideologies will undoubtedly enhance the quality of future 
research and give a better understanding of ideology itself and asymmetries connected to their 





Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). The 
authoritarian personality. Studies in Prejudice. New York: Harper & Brothers. 
Altemeyer, B. (1998). The other "authoritarian personality". Advances in experimental social 
psychology, 30, 47–92. 
Atieh, J. M., Brief, A. P., & Vollrath, D. A. (1987). The Protestant work ethic-conservatism 
paradox: beliefs and values in work and life. Personality and Individual Differences, 
8(4), 577–580. 
Azevedo, F., Jost, J. T., Rothmund, T., & Sterling, J. (2019). Neoliberal Ideology and the 
Justification of Inequality in Capitalist Societies: Why Social and Economic Dimensions 
of Ideology Are Intertwined. Journal of Social Issues, 75(1), 49–88. 
Barber, M., & Pope, J. C. (2018). Who is Ideological? Measuring Ideological Consistency in 
the American Public. The Forum, 16(1), 97–122. 
Barber, M., & Pope, J. C. (2019). Does Party Trump Ideology? Disentangling Party and 
Ideology in America. American Political Science Review, 113(1), 38–54. 
BARRON, F. (1953). Complexity-simplicity as a personality dimension. Journal of abnormal 
psychology, 48(2), 163–172. 
Bauer, P. C., Barberá, P., Ackermann, K., & Venetz, A. (2017). Is the Left-Right Scale a Valid 
Measure of Ideology? Political Behavior, 39(3), 553–583. 
Benjamin Jr, A. J. (2014). Chasing the elusive left-wing authoritarian: An examination of 
Altemeyer’s right-wing authoritarianism and left-wing authoritarianism scales. National 







Bennett, S. E. (2006). Democratic competence, before converse and after. Critical Review, 
18(1-3), 105–141. 
Bizer, G. Y., Krosnick, J. A., Holbrook, A. L., Wheeler, S. C., Rucker, D. D., & Petty, R. E. 
(2004). The impact of personality on cognitive, behavioral, and affective political 
processes: the effects of need to evaluate. Journal of Personality, 72(5), 995–1027. 
40 
 
Block, J., & Block, J. H. (2006). Nursery school personality and political orientation two 
decades later. Journal of Research in Personality, 40(5), 734–749. 
Brandt, M. J., Chambers, J. R., Crawford, J. T., Wetherell, G., & Reyna, C. (2015). Bounded 
openness: The effect of openness to experience on intolerance is moderated by target 
group conventionality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 109(3), 549–568. 
Brandt, M. J., Evans, A. M., & Crawford, J. T. (2015). The unthinking or confident extremist? 
Political extremists are more likely than moderates to reject experimenter-generated 
anchors. Psychological science, 26(2), 189–202. 
Brandt, M. J., & Reyna, C. (2010). The role of prejudice and the need for closure in religious 
fundamentalism. Personality & social psychology bulletin, 36(5), 715–725. 
Brown, R. (2004). The Authoritarian Personality and the Organization of Attitudes. In J. T. Jost 
& J. Sidanius (Eds.), Key readings in social psychology. Political psychology. Key 
readings (pp. 39–68). London: Routledge. 
Brundidge, J., Reid, S. A., Choi, S., & Muddiman, A. (2014). The “Deliberative Digital Divide:” 
Opinion Leadership and Integrative Complexity in the U.S. Political Blogosphere. 
Political Psychology, 35(6), 741–755. 
BUDNER, S. (1962). Intolerance of ambiguity as a personality variable. Journal of personality, 
30, 29–50. 
Burke, S. E., Dovidio, J. F., Przedworski, J. M., Hardeman, R. R., Perry, S. P., Phelan, S. M., 
et al. (2015). Do Contact and Empathy Mitigate Bias Against Gay and Lesbian People 
Among Heterosexual First-Year Medical Students? A Report From the Medical 
Student CHANGE Study. Academic medicine : journal of the Association of American 
Medical Colleges, 90(5), 645–651. 
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., Feinstein, J. A., & Jarvis, W. B. G. (1996). Dispositional 
differences in cognitive motivation: The life and times of individuals varying in need for 
cognition. Psychological bulletin, 119(2), 197–253. 
Caparos, S., Fortier-St-Pierre, S., Gosselin, J., Blanchette, I., & Brisson, B. (2015). The tree 
to the left, the forest to the right: political attitude and perceptual bias. Cognition, 134, 
155–164. 
Carsey, T. M., & Layman, G. C. (2006). Changing Sides or Changing Minds? Party 
Identification and Policy Preferences in the American Electorate. American Journal of 
Political Science, 50(2), 464–477, from www.jstor.org/stable/3694284.  
41 
 
Cavazza, N., & Mucchi-Faina, A. (2008). Me, us, or them: who is more conformist? Perception 
of conformity and political orientation. The Journal of social psychology, 148(3), 335–
345. 
Chirumbolo, A. (2002). The relationship between need for cognitive closure and political 
orientation: the mediating role of authoritarianism. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 32(4), 603–610. 
Chirumbolo, A., Areni, A., & Sensales, G. (2004). Need for cognitive closure and politics: 
Voting, political attitudes and attributional style. International Journal of Psychology, 
39(4), 245–253. 
Choma, B. L., Hafer, C. L., Dywan, J., Segalowitz, S. J., & Busseri, M. A. (2012). Political 
liberalism and political conservatism: Functionally independent? Personality and 
Individual Differences, 53(4), 431–436. 
Cichocka, A., Bilewicz, M., Jost, J. T., Marrouch, N., & Witkowska, M. (2016). On the Grammar 
of Politics-or Why Conservatives Prefer Nouns. Political Psychology, 37(6), 799–815. 
Conway, L. G., Gornick, L. J., Houck, S. C., Anderson, C., Stockert, J., Sessoms, D., & McCue, 
K. (2016). Are Conservatives Really More Simple-Minded than Liberals? The Domain 
Specificity of Complex Thinking. Political Psychology, 37(6), 777–798. 
Cornelis, I., & van Hiel, A. (2006). The Impact of Cognitive Styles on Authoritarianism Based 
Conservatism and Racism. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 28(1), 37–50. 
Crowson, H. M. (2009). Are all conservatives alike? A study of the psychological correlates of 
cultural and economic conservatism. The Journal of psychology, 143(5), 449–463. 
Crowson, H. M., Thoma, S. J., & Hestevold, N. (2005). Is political conservatism synonymous 
with authoritarianism? The Journal of social psychology, 145(5), 571–592. 
Darr, J. P., & Dunaway, J. L. (2018). Resurgent Mass Partisanship Revisited: The Role of 
Media Choice in Clarifying Elite Ideology. American Politics Research, 46(6), 943–970. 
DAVIDS, A. (1955). Some personality and intellectual correlates of intolerance of ambiguity. 
Journal of abnormal psychology, 51(3), 415–420. 
DAVIDS, A., & ERIKSEN, C. W. (1957). Some social and cultural factors determining relations 
between authoritarianism and measures of neuroticism. Journal of consulting 
psychology, 21(2), 155–159. 
Deppe, K. D., Gonzalez, F. J., Neiman, J. L., Jacobs, C., Pahlke, J., Smith, K. B., & Hibbing, 
J. R. (2015). Reflective liberals and intuitive conservatives: A look at the Cognitive 
Reflection Test and ideology. Judgment and Decision Making, 10(4), 314–331. 
42 
 
Ditto, P. H., Liu, B. S., Clark, C. J., Wojcik, S. P., Chen, E. E., Grady, R. H., et al. (2019). At 
Least Bias Is Bipartisan: A Meta-Analytic Comparison of Partisan Bias in Liberals and 
Conservatives. Perspectives on psychological science : a journal of the Association for 
Psychological Science, 14(2), 273–291. 
Duckitt, J., & Sibley, C. G. (2009). A Dual Process Motivational Model of Ideological Attitudes 
and System Justifi cation. In J. T. Jost, A. C. Kay, & H. Thorisdottir (Eds.), Series in 
political psychology. Social and psychological bases of ideology and system 
justification (pp. 292–313). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Duriez, B., & Soenens, B. (2006). Personality, identity styles and authoritarianism: an 
integrative study among late adolescents. European Journal of Personality, 20(5), 
397–417. 
Elliot, A. J. (Ed.) (2014). Advances in motivation science ; vol. 1 (2014). [Erscheinungsort nicht 
ermittelbar]: [Verlag nicht ermittelbar]. 
Erikson, R. S., & Tedin, K. L. (2001). American public opinion: Its origins, content, and impact 
(6th ed.). New York: Longman. 
Everett, J. A. C. (2013). The 12 item Social and Economic Conservatism Scale (SECS). PloS 
one, 8(12), e82131. 
Federico, C. M., Deason, G., & Fisher, E. L. (2012). Ideological asymmetry in the relationship 
between epistemic motivation and political attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 103(3), 381–398. 
Federico, C. M., & Goren, P. (2009). Motivated Social Cognition and Ideology: Is Attention to 
Elite Discourse a Prerequisite for Epistemically Motivated Political Affi nities? In J. T. 
Jost, A. C. Kay, & H. Thorisdottir (Eds.), Series in political psychology. Social and 
psychological bases of ideology and system justification (pp. 267–291). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Feldman, S., & Johnston, C. (2014). Understanding the Determinants of Political Ideology: 
Implications of Structural Complexity. Political Psychology, 35(3), 337–358. 
Fibert, Z., & Ressler, W. H. (1998). Intolerance of Ambiguity and Political Orientation Among 
Israeli University Students. The Journal of social psychology, 138(1), 33–40. 
Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 19(4), 25–42. 
Freeze, M., & Montgomery, J. M. (2016). Static Stability and Evolving Constraint. American 
Politics Research, 44(3), 415–447. 
43 
 
FRENCH, E. G. (1955). Interrelation among some measures of rigidity under stress and 
nonstress conditions. Journal of abnormal psychology, 51(1), 114–118. 
FRUCHTER, B., & ROKEACH, M. (1956). A factorial study of dogmatism and related concepts. 
Journal of abnormal psychology, 53(3), 356–360. 
Furnham, A., & Ribchester, T. (1995). Tolerance of ambiguity: A review of the concept, its 
measurement and applications. Current Psychology, 14(3), 179–199. 
Gillies, J., & Campbell, S. (1985). Conservatism and poetry preferences. British Journal of 
Social Psychology, 24(3), 223–227. 
Goethe, J. W. von (1840). Die Wahlverwandtschaften: Ein Roman. Goethe's sämtliche Werke 
in vierzig Bänden: Vol. 15. Stuttgart und Tübingen: J. G. Gotta'scher Verlag. 
Golec de Zavala, A., Cislak, A., & Wesolowska, E. (2010). Political Conservatism, Need for 
Cognitive Closure, and Intergroup Hostility. Political Psychology, 31(4), 521–541. 
Golec de Zavala, A., & van Bergh, A. (2007). Need for Cognitive Closure and Conservative 
Political Beliefs: Differential Mediation by Personal Worldviews. Political Psychology, 
28(5), 587–608. 
Greenberg, J., Koole, S. L., & Pyszczynski, T. (Eds.) (2004). Handbook of Experimental 
Existential Psychology: Guilford Press. 
Greenberg, J., Reiner, K., & Meiran, N. (2012). "Mind the trap": mindfulness practice reduces 
cognitive rigidity. PloS one, 7(5), e36206. 
Grossmann, M., & Hopkins, D. A. (2016). Asymmetric politics: Ideological Republicans and 
group interest Democrats. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Gruenfeld, D. H. (1995). Status, ideology, and integrative complexity on the U.S. Supreme 
Court: Rethinking the politics of political decision making. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 68(1), 5–20. 
Hancock, J., Roberts, M., Monrouxe, L., & Mattick, K. (2015). Medical student and junior 
doctors' tolerance of ambiguity: development of a new scale. Advances in health 
sciences education: theory and practice, 20(1), 113–130. 
Hennes, E. P., Nam, H. H., Stern, C., & Jost, J. T. (2012). Not All Ideologies are Created 
Equal: Epistemic, Existential, and Relational Needs Predict System-Justifying 
Attitudes. Social Cognition, 30(6), 669–688. 
Hession, E., & McCarthy, E. (1975). Human Performance in Assessing Subjective Probability 
Distributions. The Irish Journal of Psychology, 3(1), 31–46. 
44 
 
Heywood, A. (2017). Political ideologies: An introduction (6. edition). Macmillan education. 
London: Palgrave. 
Hinze, T., Doster, J., & Joe, V. C. (1997). The relationship of conservatism and cognitive-
complexity. Personality and Individual Differences, 22(2), 297–298. 
Holm, J. D., & Robinson, J. P. (1978). Ideological Identification and the American Voter. Public 
Opinion Quarterly, 42(2), 235–246. 
Huddy, L., Sears, D. O., & Levy, J. S. (Eds.) (2013). Oxford Handbooks Online. The Oxford 
Handbook of Political Psychology (2nd ed.): Oxford University Press. 
Iannello, P., Mottini, A., Tirelli, S., Riva, S., & Antonietti, A. (2017). Ambiguity and uncertainty 
tolerance, need for cognition, and their association with stress. A study among Italian 
practicing physicians. Medical education online, 22(1), 1270009. 
Jacoby, W. G. (2009). Ideology and vote choice in the 2004 election. Electoral Studies, 28(4), 
584–594. 
Johnson, S. D., & Tamney, J. B. (2001). Social traditionalism and economic conservatism: two 
conservative political ideologies in the United States. The Journal of social psychology, 
141(2), 233–243. 
Johnston, C. D., Newman, B. J., & Velez, Y. (2015). Ethnic Change, Personality, and 
Polarization Over Immigration in the American Public. Public Opinion Quarterly, 79(3), 
662–686. 
Johnston, C. D., & Wronski, J. (2015). Personality Dispositions and Political Preferences 
Across Hard and Easy Issues. Political Psychology, 36(1), 35–53. 
Jonas, K., Stroebe, W., & Hewstone, M. (Eds.) (2014). Sozialpsychologie. Berlin, Heidelberg: 
Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
Jost, J. T. (2009). “Elective Affinities”: On the Psychological Bases of Left–Right Differences. 
Psychological Inquiry, 20(2-3), 129–141. 
Jost, J. T. (2017). Ideological Asymmetries and the Essence of Political Psychology. Political 
Psychology, 38(2), 167–208. 
Jost, J. T. (2019). A quarter century of system justification theory: Questions, answers, 
criticisms, and societal applications. British Journal of Social Psychology, 58(2), 263–
314. 
Jost, J. T., Federico, C. M., & Napier, J. L. (2009). Political ideology: its structure, functions, 
and elective affinities. Annual review of psychology, 60, 307–337. 
45 
 
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003a). Exceptions that prove the 
rule--Using a theory of motivated social cognition to account for ideological 
incongruities and political anomalies: Reply to Greenberg and Jonas (2003). 
Psychological bulletin, 129(3), 383–393. 
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003b). Political conservatism as 
motivated social cognition. Psychological bulletin, 129(3), 339–375. 
Jost, J. T., & Krochik, M. (2014). Ideological Differences in Epistemic Motivation: Implications 
for Attitude Structure, Depth of Information Processing, Susceptibility to Persuasion, 
and Stereotyping. In A. J. Elliot (Ed.), Advances in motivation science: vol. 1 (2014) 
(pp. 181–231). [Erscheinungsort nicht ermittelbar]: [Verlag nicht ermittelbar]. 
Jost, J. T., Ledgerwood, A., & Hardin, C. D. (2008). Shared Reality, System Justification, and 
the Relational Basis of Ideological Beliefs. Social and Personality Psychology 
Compass, 2(1), 171–186. 
Jost, J. T., Napier, J. L., Thorisdottir, H., Gosling, S. D., Palfai, T. P., & Ostafin, B. (2007). Are 
needs to manage uncertainty and threat associated with political conservatism or 
ideological extremity? Personality & social psychology bulletin, 33(7), 989–1007. 
Jost, J. T., Sterling, J., & Stern, C. (2018). Getting closure on conservatism, or the politics of 
epistemic and existential motivation. In A. W. Kruglanski, C. E. Kopetz, & A. Fishbach 
(Eds.), The motivation-cognition interface. From the lab to the real world: a festschrift 
in honor of Arie W. Kruglanski (pp. 56–87). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Jost, J. T., Stern, C., Rule, N. O., & Sterling, J. (2017). The Politics of Fear: Is There an 
Ideological Asymmetry in Existential Motivation? Social Cognition, 35(4), 324–353. 
Jost, J. T., van der Linden, S., Panagopoulos, C., & Hardin, C. D. (2018). Ideological 
asymmetries in conformity, desire for shared reality, and the spread of misinformation. 
Current opinion in psychology, 23, 77–83. 
Jost, J. T., Fitzsimons, G., & Kay, A. C (2004). The ideological animal: A system justification 
view. In J. Greenberg, S. L. Koole, & T. Pyszczynski (Ed.), Handbook of Experimental 
Existential Psychology (pp. 263–283). Guilford Press. 
Jost, John, T., Kruglanski, A. W., & Simon, L. (2012, 1999). Effects of Epistemic Motivation on 
Conservatism, Intolerance, and Other System-Justifying Attitudes. In L. L. Thompson, 
J. M. Levine, & D. M. Messick (Eds.), LEA's organization and management series. 
Shared cognition in organizations. The management of knowledge (pp. 91–116). New 
York: Psychology Press. 
46 
 
Jugert, P., Cohrs, J. C., & Duckitt, J. (2009). Inter- and intrapersonal processes underlying 
authoritarianism: The role of social conformity and personal need for structure. 
European Journal of Personality, 23(7), 607–621. 
Kahan, D. M. (2013). Ideology, motivated reasoning, and cognitive reflection. Judgment and 
Decision Making, 8(4), 407–424. 
Kahoe, R. D. (1974). Personality and achievement correlates of intrinsic and extrinsic religious 
orientations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29(6), 812–818. 
Kelemen, L., Szabó, Z. P., Mészáros, N. Z., László, J., & Forgas, J. P. (2014). Social Cognition 
and Democracy: The Relationship Between System Justification, Just World Beliefs, 
Authoritarianism, Need for Closure, and Need for Cognition in Hungary. Journal of 
Social and Political Psychology, 2(1), 197–219. 
Kemmelmeier, M. (1997). Need for Closure and Political Orientation Among German 
University Students. The Journal of social psychology, 137(6), 787–789. 
Kemmelmeier, M. (2007). Political conservatism, rigidity, and dogmatism in American foreign 
policy officials: the 1966 Mennis data. The Journal of psychology, 141(1), 77–90. 
Kemmelmeier, M. (2010). Authoritarianism and its relationship with intuitive-experiential 
cognitive style and heuristic processing. Personality and Individual Differences, 48(1), 
44–48. 
Kerlinger, F., & ROKEACH, M. (1966). The factorial nature of the F and D scales. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 4(4), 391–399. 
Kidd, A. H., & Kidd, R. M. (1972). Relation of F-test scores to rigidity. Perceptual and motor 
skills, 34(1), 239–243. 
Kirton, M. J. (1978). Wilson and Patterson's Conservatism Scale: A shortened alternative form. 
British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 17(4), 319–323. 
Knight, K. (1985). Ideology in the 1980 Election: Ideological Sophistication Does Matter. The 
Journal of Politics, 47(3), 828–853. 
Knight, K. (1998). Liberalism and Conservatism. In J. P. Robinson, P. R. Shaver, & L. S. 
Wrightsman (Eds.), Measures of social psychological attitudes: v. 2. Measures of 
political attitudes (pp. 59–158). San Diego: London :  Academic. 
Kohn, P. M. (1974). Authoritarianism, rebelliousness, and their correlates among British 
undergraduates. British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 13(3), 245–255. 
47 
 
Kossowska, M., & van Hiel, A. (2003). The Relationship Between Need for Closure and 
Conservative Beliefs in Western and Eastern Europe. Political Psychology, 24(3), 501–
518. 
Krosch, A. R., Berntsen, L., Amodio, D. M., Jost, J. T., & van Bavel, J. J. (2013). On the 
ideology of hypodescent: Political conservatism predicts categorization of racially 
ambiguous faces as Black. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49(6), 1196–
1203. 
Ksiazkiewicz, A., Ludeke, S., & Krueger, R. (2016). The Role of Cognitive Style in the Link 
Between Genes and Political Ideology. Political Psychology, 37(6), 761–776. 
Layman, G. C., & Carsey, T. M. (2002). Party Polarization and "Conflict Extension" in the 
American Electorate. American Journal of Political Science, 46(4), 786–802, from 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3088434. 
Leone, L., & Chirumbolo, A. (2008). Conservatism as motivated avoidance of affect: Need for 
affect scales predict conservatism measures. Journal of Research in Personality, 42(3), 
755–762. 
Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1944). A Scale for the Measurement of Anti-Semitism. The 
Journal of psychology, 17(2), 339–370. 
Levitt, S. D. (1996). How do senators vote? Disentangling the role of voter preferences, party 
affiliation, and senator ideology. The American Economic Review, 86(3), 425–441. 
Lupton, R. N., Myers, W. M., & Thornton, J. R. (2015). Political Sophistication and the 
Dimensionality of Elite and Mass Attitudes, 1980−2004. The Journal of Politics, 77(2), 
368–380. 
Lupton, R. N., Smallpage, S. M., & Enders, A. M. (2020). Values and Political Predispositions 
in the Age of Polarization: Examining the Relationship between Partisanship and 
Ideology in the United States, 1988–2012. British Journal of Political Science, 50(1), 
241–260. 
Lytwyn, T. (2012). The Personality of Policy Preferences: Analyzing the Relationship between 
Myers-Briggs Personality Types and Political Views. Res Publica - Journal of, 17(1), 
99–119, from http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/respublica/vol17/iss1/11. 
Malka, A., Soto, C. J., Inzlicht, M., & Lelkes, Y. (2014). Do needs for security and certainty 
predict cultural and economic conservatism? A cross-national analysis. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 106(6), 1031–1051. 
48 
 
McAllister, P. O., & Anderson, A. (1991). Conservatism and the comprehension of implausible 
text. European Journal of Social Psychology, 21(2), 147–164. 
Meirick, P. C., & Bessarabova, E. (2016). Epistemic Factors in Selective Exposure and 
Political Misperceptions on the Right and Left. Analyses of Social Issues and Public 
Policy, 16(1), 36–68.  
Meiser, T., & Machunsky, M. (2008). The Personal Structure of Personal Need for Structure. 
European Journal of Psychological Assessment, 24(1), 27–34. 
Nam, H. H., Jost, J. T., & van Bavel, J. J. (2013). "Not for all the tea in China!" political ideology 
and the avoidance of dissonance-arousing situations. PloS one, 8(4), e59837. 
Neuberg, S. L., & Newsom, J. T. (1993). Personal need for structure: Individual differences in 
the desire for simpler structure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65(1), 
113–131. 
NEURINGER, C. (1964). THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AUTHORITARIANISM, RIGIDITY, 
AND ANXIETY. The Journal of general psychology, 71, 169–175. 
Ng, N. W.K., Haslam, S. A., Haslam, C., & Cruwys, T. (2018). “How can you make friends if 
you don't know who you are?” A qualitative examination of international students' 
experience informed by the Social Identity Model of Identity Change. 
Nilsson, A., & Jost, J. T. (2017). Rediscovering Tomkins’ Polarity Theory: Humanism, 
Normativism, and the Bipolar Structure of Left-Right Ideology in the U.S. and Sweden. 
Okimoto, T. G., & Gromet, D. M. (2016). Differences in sensitivity to deviance partly explain 
ideological divides in social policy support. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 111(1), 98–117. 
Onraet, E., van Hiel, A., Roets, A., & Cornelis, I. (2011). The closed mind: ‘Experience’ and 
‘cognition’ aspects of openness to experience and need for closure as psychological 
bases for right-wing attitudes. European Journal of Personality, 25(3), 184–197. 
Panno, A., Carrus, G., Brizi, A., Maricchiolo, F., Giacomantonio, M., & Mannetti, L. (2018). 
Need for Cognitive Closure and Political Ideology. Social Psychology, 49(2), 103–112. 
Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2019). Cognitive Reflection and the 2016 U.S. Presidential 
Election. Personality & social psychology bulletin, 45(2), 224–239. 
Perry, R., & Sibley, C. G. (2013). A Dual-Process Motivational Model of Social and Economic 
Policy Attitudes. Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 13(1), 262–285. 
Pettigrew, T. F. (1958). The measurement and correlates of category width as a cognitive 
variable1. Journal of Personality, 26(4), 532–544. 
49 
 
Phelan, S. M., Burgess, D. J., Burke, S. E., Przedworski, J. M., Dovidio, J. F., Hardeman, R., 
et al. (2015). Beliefs about the causes of obesity in a national sample of 4th year 
medical students. Patient education and counseling, 98(11), 1446–1449. 
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: 
A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 67(4), 741–763. 
Price, E., Ottati, V., Wilson, C., & Kim, S. (2015). Open-Minded Cognition. Personality & social 
psychology bulletin, 41(11), 1488–1504. 
Pyron, B. (1966). A factor-analytic study of simplicity-complexity of social ordering. Perceptual 
and motor skills, 22(1), 259–272. 
Ray, J. J. (1985). Defective Validity in the Altemeyer Authoritarianism Scale. The Journal of 
social psychology, 125(2), 271–272. 
Rock, M. S., & Janoff-Bulman, R. (2010). Where Do We Draw Our Lines? Politics, Rigidity, 
and the Role of Self-Regulation. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 1(1), 
26–33. 
Rokeach, M. (1954). THE NATURE AND MEANING OF DOGMATISM. Psychological Review, 
61(3), 194–204. 
Rokeach, M. (1956). Political and religious dogmatism: An alternative to the authoritarian 
personality. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 70(18), 1–43. 
Rokeach, M. (1960). The open and closed mind: Investigations into the nature of belief 
systems and personality systems: Investigations into the nature of belief systems and 
personality systems. New York: Basic Books, inc. 
Rudin, S. A., & Stagner, R. (1958). Figure-Ground Phenomena in the Perception of Physical 
and Social Stimuli. The Journal of psychology, 45(2), 213–225. 
Ruth Glasgow, M., Cartier, A. M., & Wilson, G. D. (1985). Conservatism, sensation-seeking 
and music preferences. Personality and Individual Differences, 6(3), 395–396. 
Sargent, M. J. (2004). Less thought, more punishment: need for cognition predicts support for 
punitive responses to crime. Personality & social psychology bulletin, 30(11), 1485–
1493. 
Schimmack, U. (2019). The Validation Crisis in Psychology. 
Schlenker, B. R., Chambers, J. R., & Le, B. M. (2012). Conservatives are happier than liberals, 
but why? Political ideology, personality, and life satisfaction. Journal of Research in 
Personality, 46(2), 127–146. 
50 
 
Schulze, R. (2004). Meta-analysis: A comparison of approaches. Toronto: Hogrefe & Huber. 
Schwarzmantel, J. J. (2008). Ideology and politics. Los Angeles [etc.]: Sage. 
Sears, D. O., & Brown, C. (2013). Childhood and Adult Political Development. In L. Huddy, D. 
O. Sears, & J. S. Levy (Eds.), Oxford Handbooks Online. The Oxford Handbook of 
Political Psychology (2nd ed., pp. 1–45). Oxford University Press. 
Sidanius, J. (1985). Cognitive Functioning and Sociopolitical Ideology Revisited. Political 
Psychology, 6(4), 637–661, from http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-
895X%28198512%296%3A4%3C637%3ACFASIR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O. 
Sidanius, J. (1978). Intolerance of ambiguity and socio-politico ideology: A multidimensional 
analysis. European Journal of Social Psychology, 8(2), 215–235. 
Smith, R. B. (1999). Untangling Political Ideology and Party Identification in the United States. 
Quality and Quantity, 33(1), 27–44. 
Smithers, A. G., & Lobley, D. M. (1978). Dogmatism, social attitudes and personality. British 
Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 17(2), 135–142. 
Soenens, B., Duriez, B., & Goossens, L. (2005). Social-psychological profiles of identity styles: 
attitudinal and social-cognitive correlates in late adolescence. Journal of adolescence, 
28(1), 107–125. 
Spears, R., & Tausch, N. (2014). Vorurteile und Intergruppenbeziehungen. In K. Jonas, W. 
Stroebe, & M. Hewstone (Eds.), Sozialpsychologie (pp. 507–564). Berlin, Heidelberg: 
Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
Steiner, I. D., & Johnson, H. H. (1963). Authoritarianism and 'Tolerance of Trait Inconsistency'. 





Sterling, J., Jost, J. T., & Pennycook, G. (2016). Are neoliberals more susceptible to bullshit? 
Judgment and Decision Making, 11(4), 352–360. 
Sterling, J., Jost, J. T., & Shrout, P. E. (2016). Mortality Salience, System Justification, and 




Stern, C., West, T. V., Jost, J. T., & Rule, N. O. (2013). The politics of gaydar: ideological 
differences in the use of gendered cues in categorizing sexual orientation. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 104(3), 520–541. 
Stern, C., West, T. V., Jost, J. T., & Rule, N. O. (2014). "Ditto Heads": Do Conservatives 
Perceive Greater Consensus Within Their Ranks Than Liberals? Personality & social 
psychology bulletin, 40(9), 1162–1177. 
Streufert, S., & Driver, M. J. (1967). Impression Formation As A Measure of The Complexity 
of Conceptual Structure. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 27(4), 1025–
1039. 
STUART, I. R. (1965). FIELD DEPENDENCY, AUTHORITARIANISM, AND PERCEPTION 
OF THE HUMAN FIGURE. The Journal of social psychology, 66, 209–214. 
Talhelm, T., Haidt, J., Oishi, S., Zhang, X., Miao, F. F., & Chen, S. (2015). Liberals think more 
analytically (more "WEIRD") than conservatives. Personality & social psychology 
bulletin, 41(2), 250–267. 
Tam, K.-P., Leung, A. K.-Y., & Chiu, C.-Y. (2008). On Being a Mindful Authoritarian: Is Need 
for Cognition Always Associated with Less Punitiveness? Political Psychology, 29(1), 
77–91. 
Tetlock, P. E. (1983). Cognitive style and political ideology. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 45(1), 118–126. 
Tetlock, P. E. (1984). Cognitive style and political belief systems in the British House of 
Commons. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46(2), 365–375. 
Tetlock, P. E., Bernzweig, J., & Gallant, J. L. (1985). Supreme Court decision making: 
Cognitive style as a predictor of ideological consistency of voting. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 48(5), 1227–1239. 
Tetlock, P. E., Hannum, K. A., & Micheletti, P. M. (1984). Stability and change in the complexity 
of senatorial debate: Testing the cognitive versus rhetorical style hypotheses. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 46(5), 979–990. 
Tetlock, P. E., Kerlinger, F. N., Maddox, W. S., & Lilie, S. A. (1985). Liberalism and 
Conservatism: The Nature and Structure of Social Attitudes. Political Psychology, 6(4), 
745–748, from https://www.jstor.org/stable/3791034. 
Thompson, R. C., & Michel, J. B. (1972). Measuring authoritarianism: a comparison of the F 
and D scales. Journal of Personality, 40(2), 180–190. 
52 
 
Thórisdóttir, H., Jost, J. T., & Kay, A. C. (2009). On the Social and Psychological Bases of 
Ideology and System Justification. In J. T. Jost, A. C. Kay, & H. Thorisdottir (Eds.), 
Series in political psychology. Social and psychological bases of ideology and system 
justification (pp. 3–26). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Thórisdóttir, H., & Jost, J. T. (2011). Motivated Closed-Mindedness Mediates the Effect of 
Threat on Political Conservatism. Political Psychology, 32(5), 785–811. 
Twenge, J. M., Honeycutt, N., Prislin, R., & Sherman, R. A. (2016). More Polarized but More 
Independent: Political Party Identification and Ideological Self-Categorization Among 
U.S. Adults, College Students, and Late Adolescents, 1970-2015. Personality & social 
psychology bulletin, 42(10), 1364–1383. 
van Hiel, A., & Mervielde, I. (2003). The Measurement of Cognitive Complexity and Its 
Relationship With Political Extremism. Political Psychology, 24(4), 781–801. 
van Hiel, A., Pandelaere, M., & Duriez, B. (2004). The impact of need for closure on 
conservative beliefs and racism: differential mediation by authoritarian submission and 
authoritarian dominance. Personality & social psychology bulletin, 30(7), 824–837. 
VANNOY, J. S. (1965). GENERALITY OF COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY-SIMPLICITY AS A 
PERSONALITY CONSTRUCT. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2, 385–
396. 
Webster, A. C., & Stewart, R. A.C. (2013). Theological Conservatism. In G. D. Wilson (Ed.), 
Routledge revivals. The psychology of conservatism (pp. 129–148). Abingdon, Oxon, 
New York, NY: Routledge. 
Webster, D. M., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1994). Individual differences in need for cognitive closure. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(6), 1049–1062. 
Wilson, G. D., & Patterson, J. R. (1968). A new measure of conservatism. British Journal of 
Social and Clinical Psychology, 7(4), 264–269.  
Yilmaz, O., & Saribay, S. A. (2016). An attempt to clarify the link between cognitive style and 
political ideology: A non-western replication and extension. Judgment and Decision 
Making, 11(3), 287–300. 
Zacker, J. (1973). Authoritarian avoidance of ambiguity. Psychological reports, 33(3), 901–
902. 
ZELEN, S. L. (1955). Goal-setting rigidity in an ambiguous situation. Journal of consulting 
psychology, 19(5), 395–399. 
53 
 
Zippel, B., & Norman, R. D. (1966). Party switching, authoritarianism, and dogmatism in the 
1964 election. Psychological reports, 19(2), 667–670. 




















Additional magnitude sizes 










French (1995) Psychological yes x    r = -0.06, n.s.   
Pettigrew (1958) Psychological yes x    r = .03, n.s.   
Rock & Janoff-
Bulman (2010), 
sample1 Symbolic no    ~.125, n.s. 
Reported size not 
r   
Rock & Janoff-
Bulman (2010), 
sample2 Symbolic no    ~.13, n.s. 
Reported size not 
r   
Hession & 
McCarthy (1975) 
group 1 Psychological yes x   significant 
r = .53, 
significance 
information not 
found   
Hession & 
McCarthy (1975) 
group 2 Psychological yes x   n.s. 
r = .14, 
significance 
information not 
found   




Psychological no    ~.22, n.s. 
No fitting results 
found   
Caparos et al. 
(2015), sample2 
Symbolic & 
Operational yes x   n.s. 
[r = .22, 
significance 
information not 
found]   
Zelen (1955) Psychological yes x    r = 0.22, significant   
55 
 
Steiner & Johnson 
(1963)  Psychological yes x    r = .26, significant   
Neuringer (1964) Psychological yes x    r = .33, significant   
Kemmelmeier 
(2007) Symbolic yes x    r = .35, significant   
Kirton (1978), 
sample 1 Operational yes x   significant 
r = .53, 
significance 
information not 
found   
Kirton (1978), 
sample 2 Operational yes x   significant 
[r = .56, 
significance 
information not 




Psychological yes x   significant 









Kidd & Kidd 




Kossowska & Van 
Hiel (2003), 
sample 1 (study 1) Symbolic yes  x  
~.24, 
significant r = .21, significant  
r = .22, 
significant 
(operational) 
Kossowska & Van 
Hiel (2003), 
sample 2 (study 1) Symbolic yes x    r = .06, n.s.   
r = .04, n.s. 
(operational) 
Kelemen et al. 
(2014) Symbolic no    
~.10, 
significant 
Reported size not 
in r   
Webster & 
Kruglanski (1994), 






identifiable no    
~.60, 
significant 
No fitting results 




identifiable no    ~.126, n.s. 
No fitting results 




identifiable  no    ~.124, n.s. 
No fitting results 




identifiable no    
~.23, 
significant 
No fitting results 




identifiable no    
~.26, 
significant 
No fitting results 
found   
Schlenker (2012) Symbolic yes x    r = .17, significant   
Choma (2012) Symbolic yes x    r = .19, significant    
Smithers & Lobley 
(1978)  no    
~.21, 
significant 
no fitting results 
found   
Price et al. (2015) 
▼ Psychological yes x    r = .238, significant   
Thorisdottir & 
Jost (2011) 
sample 3 Symbolic no    
~.24, 
significant 
No fitting results 
found   
Kemmelmeier 
(2007) Symbolic yes x    r = .27, significant   




Psychological yes x    
[r = .285, 
significant]  







Psychological yes x    [r = .32, significant]  
r = .25, 
significant 
(symbolic) 





identifiable no    
~.36, 
significant 
No fitting results 
found 
r = .44, 
significant 
(social) 











Crowson (2009) Operational yes  x  
~.37, 
significant 
[r = .353, 
significant] 
r = .500, 
significant 
(social) 




sample 1 Operational yes  x  
~.40, 
significant 
r = .38, 
significance 
information not 
found   
Kirton (1978), 
sample 2 Operational no    
~.49, 
significant 
[r = .46, 
significance 
information not 
found]   
Rule & Hewitt 
(1970) 
Source not 
found         
Kohn (1974) ▼ Psychological yes x    r = .48, significant   
Jost et al. (2007) Symbolic yes  x  
~.48, 




identifiable no    
~.48, 
significant 
No fitting results 
found 




(economic)   
Rokeach (1956), 
sample 1 Psychological yes x   significant 








(economic)   
Rokeach (1956), 
sample 2 Psychological yes x   significant 




r = .11, 
significance 






sample 3 Psychological yes x   significant 








(economic)   
Rokeach (1956), 
sample 4 Psychological yes x   significant 








(economic)   
Rokeach (1956), 
sample 5 Psychological yes x   significant 
r = .57, 
significance 
information not 
found    
Rokeach (1956), 
sample 6 Psychological yes x   significant 
r = .62, 
significance 
information not 
found    
Rokeach (1956), 
sample 7 Psychological yes x   significant 
r = .77, 
significance 
information not 
found    
Pyron (1966) Psychological yes x   significant r = .53, significant   
Hession & 
McCarthy (1975), 
sample 1 Psychological yes x   significant 
r =.64, significance 
information not 
found   
Hession & 
McCarthy (1975), 
sample 2 Psychological yes x   n.s. 
r =.53, significance 
information not 




found         
Webster & Stewart 
(2013) Operational yes x   significant 
r = .58, 






sample 1 Psychological yes x   significant 
r = .77, 
significance 
information not 
found   
Plant (1960), 
sample 2 Psychological yes x   significant 
r = .62, 
significance 
information not 
found   
Plant (1960), 
sample 3 Psychological yes x   significant 
r = .75, 
significance 
information not 
found   
Plant (1960), 
sample 4 Psychological yes x   significant 
r = .70, 
significance 
information not 
found   
Thompson & 
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Jost (2007), 
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Gillies and 
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Caparos et al. 
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Pyron (1966) Psychological no    
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Rule & Hewitt 
(1970) 
Source not 
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Reported size not 
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(economic)  
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significance 
information not 
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Mervielde (2003) 
Symbolic & 
Operational yes x    r = -.12, n.s.   
Sidanius (1985) Operationals yes x    r = -.11, n.s. 
r = .06, n.s. 
(economic)  
Hinze et al. (1997) Operational no    ~-.11, n.s. 
Reported size not 
r   
Stuart (1965), 
sample 1 Psychological yes x    r = -.08, n.s.   
Stuart (1965), 
sample 2 Psychological yes x    r = -.06, n.s.   
Cornelis & Van 
Hiel (2006) Operationals yes  x  ~-.07, n.s r = -.06, n.s. 
r = -.11, n.s. 
(economic)  
Conway et al. 
(2015), sample 2 Symbolic no    ~.0, n.s. 
Reported size not 
r   
Conway et al. 
(2015), sample 3 Symbolic no    ~-.001, n.s. 
No fitting result 
found   
Gruenfeld (1995), 
sample 1 Symbolic no    ~.19, n.s. 
Reported size not 
r   
Gruenfeld (1995), 
sample 2 Operational no    ~.16, n.s. 
Reported size not 
r   
Gruenfeld (1995), 
sample 3 Operational no    ~-.01, n.s. 
Reported size not 
r   
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French (1995) Psychological yes x    r = .01, n.s   
Kelemen et al. 
(2014) Symbolic no    
~.07, 
significant reported size not r   
Davids & Eriksen 
(1957) Psychological yes x    r =.10, n.s.   
Okimoto & 
Gromet (2015), 
sample 1A Symbolic no    
~.145, 





sample 2A Symbolic no    
~.12, 





identifiable no    
~.13, 





identifiable no    
~.115, 
significant reported size not r   
Choma et al. 
(2012)  Symbolic yes x    r = .14, significant 
[r = 0.085, 
n.s. 
(economic)] 
[r = .19, 
significant 
(social)]  
Crowson et al. 
(2005), sample 1 
Operational & 
Psychological yes x    
[r = .225; 
significant]  
r = .19, 
significant 
(operational) 
Crowson et al. 
(2005), sample 2 
Symbolic, 
Operational & 
Psychological yes x    [r = .16, n.s.]  
r = .18, 
significant 
(operational) 




Psychological yes x    [r = .19, n.s.] 
r = .25, 
significant 
(economic)    
r = .29, 
significant 
(social)  
Davids (1955) Psychological yes x    r = .18, n.s.   
Kossowska & Van 
Hiel (2003), 
sample 1 (study 1) 
Symbolic & 
Operational yes x    r = .22, significant   
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Kossowska & Van 
Hiel (2003), 
sample 2 (study 1) 
Symbolic & 
Operational yes x    r = .36, significant    







partly reported in r   
De Rojas (2015) Psychological yes x    
[r = .245, 
significant]   
Vannoy (1965) Psychological yes x   significant 
r = .28, 
significance 
information not 
found   
Jost et al. (2007), 
sample 3 Symbolic yes x    r = .30, significant   
Kirton (1978), 
sample 1 Operational yes x   significant 
r = .36, 
significance 
information not 
found   
Kirton (1978), 
sample 2 Operational yes  x  
~.53, 
significant 
r = .59, 
significance 
information not 
found   
Filbert & Ressler 
(1998) 
Symbolic & 
Operational no    
~.39, 
significant reported size not r   
Caparos et al. 
(2015), sample 2 
Symbolic & 
Operational yes x    r = .45, significant   
Lytwyn (2012) Operational no    
~.51, 
significant 
r = -.075, 
significant   
Kohn (1974) ▼ 
Not 
identifiable no    
~.60, 
significant reported size not r   
 




Brandt et al. 
(2015), sample 1 Symbolic no    ~.04, n.s 
no fitting results 
found   
Brandt et al. 
(2015), sample 2 Symbolic no    ~.12, n.s. 
no fitting results 
found   
Brandt et al. 
(2015), sample 3 Symbolic no    ~-.03, n.s. 
no fitting results 
found   
Feldman & 
Johnston (2014), 
sample 2 Operational no    ~-.01, n.s reported size not r   
Nilsson & Jost 
(2016), sample 1 Symbolic yes x    r = .23, significant   
Nilsson & Jost 
(2016), sample 2 
Symbolic, 
Operational & 
Psychological yes x    
[r = .1175, 
significant]  
r = .18, 
significant 
(operational) 
r = .13, 
significant 
(symbolic) 
Nilsson & Jost 
(2016), sample 3 
Symbolic & 
Psychological yes x    [r = .28, significant]   
Phelan et al. 
(2015) 
Not 





no fitting results 
found   
Burke et al. (2015) 
Not 





no fitting results 
found   
Brandt & Reyna 
(2010), sample 2 
 Not 
identifiable no    ~.124, n.s. 
no fitting results 
found   
Johnston & 
Wronski (2015), 
control sample Operational no    ~.124, n.s. 
no fitting results 
found   
Johnston & 
Wronski (2015), 
RWA sample Psychological no    ~.28, sign. 
no fitting results 
found   
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Kossowska & Van 
Hiel (2003), 
sample 1 study 1 Symbolic yes x    r = .22, significant  
r = .22, 
significant 
(operational) 
Kossowska & Van 
Hiel (2003), 
sample 2 Symbolic yes  x  ~.40, sign. r = .38, significant  
r = .52, 
significant 
(operational) 
r = .38, 
significant 
(symbolic) 
Kossowska & Van 
Hiel (2003), 
sample 3 Symbolic no    
~.125, 
significant r = .26, significant 
r = .44, 
significant 
(social) 
r = -.30, 
significant 
(economic)  
Kossowska & Van 
Hiel (2003), 
sample 4 Symbolic yes x    r = .32, significant 
r = .26, 
significant 
(social) 







found         
Meirick & 
Bessarabova 
(2016) Symbolic yes x    r =.12, n.s.    
Federico, Fisher & 
Deason (2012) Symbolic yes x    r = .15, significant  
r = .18, 
significant 
(operational) 







Krueger (2016) Operationals yes x    r = .20, significant 
r = .13, 
significant 
(economic) 




r = .14, 
significance 
level not found 
(symbolic) 
Brandt & 
Crawford (2013) Symbolic no    ~.126, n.s. reported size not r   
Okimoto & 
Gromet (2015), 
sample 1 (study 
1A) Symbolic yes x    r = .19, significant   
Okimoto & 
Gromet (2015), 
sample 3 (study 3) Symbolic yes x    r = .18, significant   
Schlenker et al. 
(2012) Symbolic yes x    r = .19, significant   




identifiable no    
~.21, 
significant 
no fitting results 
found   
Jost et al. (1999), 
sample 1 Symbolic yes x    r = .21, significant   
Jost et al. (1999), 
sample 2 Symbolic yes x    r = .26, significant   
Golec de Zavala et 
al. (2010), sample 
1 Symbolic yes x    r = .22, significant   
Golec de Zavala et 
al. (2010), sample 
2 Symbolic yes x    r = .24, significant   
Yilmaz & Saribay 
(2016), sample 2 Symbolic no       
~.25, 
significant r = .164, significant 








Chirumbolo et al. 
(2004) ▼ 
Not 
identifiable no    ~.23, sign. reported size not r   
Webster & 
Kruglanski (1994), 
sample 2 (study 2) Psychological yes x    
r = .2660, 
significant   
Crowson et al. 
(2005), sample 1 
Operational & 
Psychological yes x    
[r = .285, 
significant]  
r = .18, 
significant 
(operational) 
Crowson et al. 
(2005), sample 2 
Symbolic, 
Operational & 
Psychological yes x    [r = .27, significant]  
r = .25, 
significant 
(operational)  






Psychological yes x    
[r = .267, 
significant]  
r = .19, 
significant 
(operational) 
Golec de Zavala & 
van Bergh (2007) Operational yes x    r = .28, significant   
Kemmelmeier 
(1997) Symbolic yes x    r = .29, significant   
Chirumbolo (2002) Symbolic no    
~.36, 
significant reported size not r   
Soenens, Duriez & 
Goossens (2005) 
Operational & 
Psychological yes x    
[r = .367, 
significant] 
r = .39, 
significant 
(social)  
Johnston et al. 
(2015) 
Not 
identifiable no    
~.48, 
significant 
no fitting results 
found   
Onraet et al. 
(2011), sample 1 Psychological yes x     r = .61, significant   
Onraet et al. 




Personal Needs for Order and Structure 
 
Burke et al. 
(unpublished) 
Source not 




found         
Cichocka et al. 
(2016), sample 1 
Symbolic & 
Operational yes x    [r = .06, n.s.] 
r = .18, 
significant 
(social) 
r = -.06, n.s. 
(economic)   




found         
French (1955) Psychological yes x    r = .11, n.s   
Kelemen et al. 
(2014) Symbolic no    
~.13, 
significant reported size not r   
Crowson (2009) Operational yes x    [r = .1455, n.s.] 
r = .287, 
significant 
(social) 
r = .004, n.s. 
(economic)  
Crowson et al. 
(2005), sample 1 
Operational & 
Psychological yes x    [r = .16, n.s.]  
r = .05, n.s. 
(operational) 
Crowson et al. 
(2005), sample 2 
Symbolic, 
Operational & 
Psychological yes x    
[r = .1967, 
significant]  
r = .15, 
significant 
(operational) 
r = .17, 
significant 
(symbolic) 
Jost et al. (2008) 
Not 
identifiable no    
~.18, 
significant 
no fitting results 
found   
Jost et al. (2007), 
sample 1 Symbolic yes x    r = .26, significant   
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Jost et al. (2007), 
sample 2 Symbolic yes x    r = .26, significant   
Jost et al. (2007), 
sample 3 Symbolic yes x    r = .18, significant   
Krosch et al. 
(2013), sample 1 
Symbolic & 
Psychological yes x    [r = .18, n.s.]  
r = .28, 
significant 
(symbolic) 
Altemeyer (1998) Psychological yes  x  
~.21, 
significant 
[r = .20, 
significance 
information not 
found]   
Webster & Stewart 
(2013) Operational yes x    r = .24, significant   
Jugert et al. 
(2009), sample 1 Psychological yes x   significant 
r = .35, 
significance 
information not 
found   
Jugert et al. 
(2009), sample 2 Psychological yes x    r = .24, significant   
Kossowska & Van 
Hiel (2003), 
sample 1, study 1 Symbolic  no    
~.24, 
significant r = .28, significant  
r = .28, 
significant 
(operational) 
Kossowska & Van 
Hiel (2003), 
sample 2, study 1 Symbolic no    
~.32, 
significant r = .29, significant  




(2010), sample 1 Psychological yes x    r = .34, significant   
Kemmelmeier 
(2010), sample 2 Psychological yes x    r = .30, significant   
Van Hiel et al. 
(2004), sample 1 
Operational & 
Psychological yes x    
[r = .4467, 
significant] 
r = .55, 
significant 
(social)  
Van Hiel et al. 
(2004), sample 2 
Operational & 
Psychological yes x    [r = .41, n.s.] 




Van Hiel et al. 
(2004), sample 3 Operationals no    ~.51, sign. r = .55, significant   
 
Need for Cognition 
 
Tam et al. (2008), 
sample 1 Psychological yes x    r = -.25, significant   
Tam et al. (2008), 
sample 2 Psychological yes x    r = -.34, significant   
Benjamin (2014) Psychological yes x    r = -.28, significant   
Stern et al. (2013), 
sample 3 Symbolic yes x    r = -.27, significant   
Sargent (2004) Symbolic no    ~-.27, sign. 
no fitting results 
found   
Hennes et al. 
(2012) Symbolic yes   x ~-.21, sign. r = -.24, significant   
Kemmelmeier 
(2010), sample 1 Psychological yes x    r = -.21, significant   
Stern & West 
(unpublished) 
Source not 
found         
Sterling et al. 
(unpublished/ 
2016) Symbolic no    ~ -.19, sign. 
no fitting results 
found   
Sterling, Jost & 
Pennycook (2016) Symbolic yes   x ~ -.19, sign. r = -.19, significant   
Ksiazkiewicz, 
Ludke & Krueger 
(2016) Symbolic yes x    r = -.16, significant 
r = -.23, 
significant 
(social) 
r = -.07, n.s. 
(economic) 
r = -.21, 
significant 
(operational) 
Altemeyer (1998) Psychological yes x    
[r = -.18, 
significance level 
not found]   
Crowson (2009) Operationals no    ~-.14, sign. reported size not r   
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Bizer et al. (2004), 
sample 1 Symbolic yes x    r = -.08, significant   
Bizer et al. (2004), 
sample 2 Symbolic yes x    r = -.03, n.s.   
Crowson et al. 
(2005), sample 1 
Operational & 
Psychological yes x    [r = -.07, n.s.]  
r = -.05 n.s. 
(operational) 
Crowson et al. 
(2005), sample 2 
Symbolic, 
Operational & 
Psychological yes x    [r = -.0467, n.s.]  
r = -.01, n.s. 
(operational) 




sample 1 Operational no    ~-.05, sign. reported size not r   
Feldman & 
Johnston (2014), 
sample 2 Operational no    ~-.03, n.s. reported size not r   
Kelemen et al. 










Psychological yes x    [r = -.23, n.s.] 
r = -.20, 
significant 
(economic) 
[r = -.21, 
significant 
(operational)]    






Psychological yes x    
[r = -.21, 
significant] 
r = .07, n.s. 
(economic) 
[r = -.134, n.s 
(operational)] 









Psychological yes x    
[r = -.195, 
significant] 
r = -.09, n.s. 
(economic) 
[r = -0.165, n.s. 
(operational)] 







Psychological yes x    [r = -.135, n.s.] 
r = .04, n.s. 
(economic) 
[r = 0.015, n.s. 
(operational)] 
r = -.11, n.s. 
(symbolic) 
Duriez & Soenens 
(2006) Psychological yes x    
[r = -.215, 
significant]   
Sterling, Jost & 
Pennycook (2016) Symbolic yes x    r = -.17, significant   
Talhelm et al. 
(2015) sample 1 Symbolic no    
~-.17, 
significant 
no fitting results 
found   
Talhelm et al. 
(2015) sample 2 Symbolic no    
~-.12, 
significant 
no fitting results 
found   
Yilmaz & Saribay 
(2016), study 1 Symbolic yes x    
r = -.163, 
significant   
Yilmaz & Saribay 
(2016), study 2 Symbolic yes x    
r = -.106, 
significant 
r = -.157, 
significant 
(social) 
r = -0.020, 
n.s. 
(economic)  
Cornelis & Van 
Hiel (2006) Operationals yes  x  ~-.015, n.s. r = -.01, n.s. 
r = -.03, n.s. 
(economic)  
Kahan (2013)  Symbolic no    ~.01, n.s r = -.02, n.s.   
Table 1 Information on papers from Jost, Sterling and Stern (2018) meta-analysis regarding the relationship of epistemic needs and ideology regarding the type 
of scale, reproducibility categorized into three levels of certainty, magnitude sizes reported by Jost and the original paper and additional magnitude sizes 
concerning social, economic, operational and symbolic ideology given by the original. 
In italic: direct measurements of ideology; in brackets: r is the average of multiple, separately conducted correlations of ideology measures and the concerning 
epistemic need; studies marked with ▼ were excluded from the analyses as they featured scales unfit to measure ideology; Operationals marks a measure of 
social ideology, Operationale marks a measure of economic ideology, see further information in the appendix. 




Paper Scale Used to measure ideology 
  
French (1995) F Scale 
Pettigrew (1958) F Scale 
Rock & Janoff-Bulman (2010), sample1 ISD 
Rock & Janoff-Bulman (2010), sample2 Ideological Self-Identification (ISD) 
Hession & McCarthy (1975) group 1 F Scale 
Hession & McCarthy (1975) group 2 F Scale 
Caparos et al. (2015), sample1 
ISD + Opinions on rising university fees, 
involvement in demonstrations + language 
scale for policy opinions for policies related to 
socioeconomics, identity, responsibility and 
moral values 
Caparos et al. (2015), sample2 
ISD + opinions on rising university fees, 
involvement in demonstrations + language 
scale for policy opinions for policies related to 
socioeconomics, identity and responsibility 
Zelen (1955) 
Children Authoritarianism Scale (children's 
version of the F scale) 
Steiner & Johnson (1963), sample 1 F Scale 
Steiner & Johnson (1963), sample 2 F Scale 
Neuringer (1964) F Scale 
Kemmelmeier (2007) ISD 
Kirton (1978), sample 1 Wilson-Patterson C Scale 
Kirton (1978), sample 2 Wilson-Patterson C Scale, shortened 
Rokeach & Fruchter (1956) F Scale + E Scale + PEC 
Kidd & Kidd (1972) F Scale 
  
Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), sample 
1 (study 1) ISD 
Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), sample 
2 (study 1) ISD 
Kelemen (2014) ISD 
Webster & Kruglanski (1994), sample 2 F Scale 
Rokeach (1960), sample 1 Not identifiable 
Rokeach (1960), sample 2 Not identifiable 
Rokeach (1960), sample 3 Not identifiable 
Rokeach (1960), sample 4 Not identifiable 
Rokeach (1960), sample 5 Not identifiable 
Schlenker (2012) ISD 
Choma (2012) ISD 
Smithers & Lobley (1978) Not identifiable 
Price et al. (2015) ▼ Political Open-Minded Cognition (OMC-P) 
Thorisdottir & Jost (2011), sample 3 ISD 
Kemmelmeier (2007) ISD 
Conway (2015) ISD 
Crowson (2005), sample 1 
McClosky & Bonn's Conservatism-Liberalism 
Scale + RWA 
Crowson (2005), sample 2 
McClosky and Bann’s Conservatism-
Liberalism Scale + ISD + RWA 




Middendorp Cultural Conservatism Scale + 
Middendorp Economic Conservatism Scale 
Kirton (1978), sample 1 Wilson-Patterson C Scale 
Kirton (1978), sample 2 Wilson-Patterson C Scale, shortened 
Rule & Hewitt (1970)  
Kohn (1974) ▼ 
Authoritarianism Rebellion Scale (ARS) - rid of 
the conservatism hinge of the F scale (Kohn, 
1974, p. 245) 
Jost et al. (2007) ISD 
Rokeach & Fruchter (1956) Not identifiable 
Rokeach (1956), sample 1 F Scale 
Rokeach (1956), sample 2 F Scale 
Rokeach (1956), sample 3 F Scale 
Rokeach (1956), sample 4 F Scale 
Rokeach (1956), sample 5 F Scale 
Rokeach (1956), sample 6 F Scale 
Rokeach (1956), sample 7 F Scale 
Pyron (1966) F Scale 
Hession & McCarthy (1975), sample 1 F Scale 
Hession & McCarthy (1975), sample 2 F Scale 
Schroder & Streufert (1962)  
Webster & Stewart (2013) Wilson-Patterson C Scale 
Plant (1960), sample 1 F Scale 
Plant (1960), sample 2 F Scale 
Plant (1960), sample 3 F Scale 
Plant (1960), sample 4 F Scale 
Thompson & Michel (1972) F Scale 
Kerlinger & Rokeach (1966), sample 1 F Scale 
Kerlinger & Rokeach (1966), sample 2 F Scale 
Kerlinger & Rokeach (1966), sample 3 F Scale 
Kahoe (1974) F Scale 
Zippel & Norman (1966) F Scale 
Pettigrew (1958) F Scale 
  
Wilson (1973) Not identifiable 
Block & Block (2006), sample 1 (men) 
 Agreement to 10 issues generally viewed as 
distinguishing the Democratic and Republican 
Parties + position regarding political rights 
(McClosky’s Dimensions of Political Tolerance 
approach) + Kerlinger Liberalism Scale + 
Kerlinger Conservatism Scale + Political 
Activism + ISD 
Block & Block (2006), sample 2 
(women) 
Agreement to 10 issues generally viewed as 
distinguishing the Democratic and Republican 
Parties + position regarding political rights 
(McClosky’s Dimensions of Political Tolerance 
approach) + Kerlinger Liberalism Scale + 
Kerlinger Conservatism Scale + Political 
Activism + ISD 
McAllister & Anderson (1991) 
Wilson-Patterson Inventory, altered in case of 
three items 
Jost (2007), sample 3 ISD 
Gillies & Campbell (1985) Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory 
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Caparos et al. (2015), sample 2 
ISD +Opinions on rising university fees + 
policy opinions for policies related to 
socioeconomics and identity and responsibility 
Glasgow & Cartier (1985) Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory  
Atieh et al. (1987) Wilson-Patterson C Scale 
Malka et al. (2014) Economic attitudes 
  
Tetlock et al. (1984), sample 1 
Classifications based on ratings by Americans 
for Democratic Action (ADA) of records of 
Congressional speeches given by senators 
who held office in the five Congresses under 
study: the 82nd, the 83rd & the 94th, the 96th 
Tetlock et al. (1984), sample 2 
Classifications based on ratings by Americans 
for Democratic Action (ADA) of records of 
Congressional speeches given by senators 
who held office in the five Congresses under 
study: the 94th, the 96th & the 97th  
Tetlock et al. (1985) 
Classifying liberal positions: pro civil liberties 
and civil rights, pro-government, pro-union, 
pro small business against large corporations, 
pro-consumer, pro environmentalist + 
classifying conservative positions 
Pyron (1966) F Scale 
Schroder & Streufert (1962)  
Rule & Hewitt (1970)  
Tetlock (1983) 
Classifications based on ratings of 1975 and 
1976 senatorial voting records by Americans 
for Democratic Action (ADA) 
Tetlock (1984) 
Ratings of parliamentarians' responses to a 
question concerning their views on the proper 
role of government in regulating the economy 
and providing social welfare 
Talhelm et al. (2015), sample 1 ISD 
Talhelm et al. (2015), sample 2 ISD 
Barron (1953) ▼ 
Form 60 of the Levinson-Sanford scale - a 
measure of anti-Semitism (Barron, 1953, p. 
172) 
Rudin & Stagner (1958) F Scale 
Brundidge (2014)  
Unambiguously conservative sites: e.g. 
Breitbart, Hit & Run, Instapundit, Michelle 
Malkin, Red State, The Blaze, The Foundry, 
and Town Hall + unambiguously liberal sites: 
Crooks and Liars, Fire Dog Lake, Hullabaloo, 
Outside the Beltway, Talking Points Memo, 
The Daily Kos, The Huffington Post, and Think 
Progress 
Streufert & Driver (1967) F Scale 
Vannoy (1965) F Scale 
Van Hiel & Mervielde (2003) 
ISD + 10 items referring to general 
conservatism + 15 items of the current political 
believes questionnaire 
Sidanius (1985) 
S4 Conservatism Scale: Sociopolitical 
attitudes 
Hinze et al. (1997) Wilson-Patterson C Scale 
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Stuart (1965), sample 1 F Scale 
Stuart (1965), sample 2 F Scale 
Cornelis & Van Hiel (2006) 12-item cultural conservatism scale 
Conway et al. (2015), sample 2 ISD 
Conway et al. (2015), sample 3 ISD 
Gruenfeld (1995), sample 1 
Justices were categorized based on their 
voting records 
Gruenfeld (1995), sample 2 
Ideological outcome of a legal outcome was 
categorized 
Gruenfeld (1995), sample 3 
Ideological outcome of a legal outcome was 
categorized 
  
French (1995) F Scale 
Kelemen (2014) ISD 
Davids & Eriksen (1957) F Scale 
Okimoto & Gromet (2015), sample 1A ISD 
Okimoto & Gromet (2015), sample 2A ISD 
Okimoto & Gromet (2015), sample 3 not identifiable 
Okimoto & Gromet (2015), sample 4 not identifiable 
Choma et al. (2012)  ISD 
Crowson et al. (2005), sample 1 
McClosky and Bann’s Conservatism–
Liberalism Scale + RWA 
Crowson et al. (2005), sample 2 
McClosky and Bann’s (1979) Conservatism–
Liberalism Scale + RWA + ISD 
Sidanius (1978) 
S4 Conservatism Scale + Authoritarian 
Aggression 
Davids (1955) F Scale 
Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), sample 
1 (study 1) 
ISD + agreement to program of major political 
parties + questionnaires designed to assess 
conservative beliefs 
Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), sample 
2 (study 1) 
ISD + agreement of program of major political 
parties + questionnaires designed to assess 
conservative beliefs 
Zacker (1973) F Scale 
De Rojas (2015) RWA+ SDO 
Vannoy (1965) F Scale 
Jost et al. (2007), sample 3 ISD 
Kirton (1978), sample 1 Wilson & Patterson C Scale, shortened 
Kirton (1978), sample 2 Wilson & Patterson C Scale, shortened 
Filbert & Ressler (1998) 
Political attitudes concerning Arab-Israeli 
conflict + Political party preference + ISD 
regarding foreign and security issues 
Caparos et al. (2015), sample 2 
ISD +opinion about a political debate over 
increasing university fees, involvement in 
demonstrations and + policy opinions for 
policies related to socioeconomics, identity 
and responsibility 
Lytwyn (2012) 
Agreement with perspectives on certain 
political issues 
Kohn (1974) ▼ 
Membership to student political organizations 
(socialist, liberal, conservative, labor) 
  
Brandt et al. (2015), sample 1 ISD 
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Brandt et al. (2015), sample 2 ISD 
Brandt et al. (2015), sample 3 ISD 
Feldman & Johnston (2014), sample 2 
 4 questions on economic ideology + 3 
questions on social ideology 
Nilsson & Jost (2016), sample 1 ISD 
Nilsson & Jost (2016), sample 2 
ISD + Everett's conservatism scale + SDO + 
RWA 
Nilsson & Jost (2016), sample 3 ISD + RWA + SDO 
Phelan et al. (2015) Not identifiable 
Burke et al. (2015) Not identifiable 
Brandt & Reyna (2010), sample 2 Not identifiable 
Johnston & Wronski (2015), control 
sample Political opinions 
Johnston & Wronski (2015), RWA 
sample 4-item RWA scale 
Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), sample 
1 study 1 ISD 
Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), sample 
2 ISD 
Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), sample 
3 ISD 
Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), sample 
4 ISD 
Brandt & Crawford (unpublished)  
Meirick & Bessarabova (2016) ISD 
Frederico et al. (2012) ISD 
Ksiazkiewicz, Ludke & Krueger (2016) 
Social policy attitudes from Wilson-Patterson 
C Scale 
Brandt & Crawford (2013) ISD 
Okimoto & Gromet (2015), sample 1 
(study 1A) ISD 
Okimoto & Gromet (2015), sample 3 
(study 3) ISD 
Schlenker et al. (2012) ISD 
Brandt, Evans, & Crawford (2015), 
sample 2 Not identifiable 
Jost et al. (1999), sample 1 ISD 
Jost et al. (1999), sample 2 ISD 
Golec de Zavala et al. (2010), sample 1 ISD 
Golec de Zavala et al. (2010), sample 2 ISD 
Yilmaz & Saribay (2016), sample 2 ISD 
Chirumbolo et al. (2004) ▼ Voting choices in the most recent election 
Webster & Kruglanski (1994), sample 2 
(study 2) F Scale 
Crowson et al. (2005), sample 1 
McClosky and Ban's Conservativism-
Liberalism Scale + RWA 
Crowson et al. (2005), sample 2 
McClosky and Ban's Conservativism-
Liberalism Scale + RWA 
Leone & Chirumbolo (2008) 
RWA + SDO + support for conservative 
policies  
Golec de Zavala & van Bergh (2007) 10-item political beliefs scale 
Kemmelmeier (1997) ISD 
Chirumbolo (2002) ISD 
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Soenens et al. (2005) 
12-item cultural conservatism scale + RWA + 
SDO 
Johnston et al. (2015)  
Onraet et al. (2011), sample 1 11-item RWA scale 
Onraet et al. (2011), sample 2 10-item General Conservatism Scale 
  
Burke et al. (unpublished)  
Burke (unpublished)  
Cichocka et al. (2016), sample 1 
ISD + support for certain social and economic 
policies 
Burke & LaFrance (unpublished), 
sample 1  
French (1955) F Scale 
Kelemen et al. (2014) ISD 
Crowson (2009) 
Middendorp Cultural conservatism Scale + 
Middendorp Economic Conservatism Scale 
Crowson et al. (2005), sample 1 
McClosky and Ban's Conservativism-
Liberalism Scale + RWA 
Crowson et al. (2005), sample 2 
ISD + RWA + McClosky and Ban's 
Conservativism-Liberalism Scale 
Jost et al. (2008) Not identifiable 
Jost et al. (2007), sample 1 ISD 
Jost et al. (2007), sample 2 ISD 
Jost et al. (2007), sample 3 ISD 
Krosch et al. (2013), sample 1 ISD + group-based dominance 
Altemeyer (1998) RWA + SDO 
Webster & Stewart (2013) Wilson-Patterson C-Scale 
Jugert et al. (2009), sample 1 Altemeyer's RWA scale, slightly modified 
Jugert et al. (2009), sample 2 Funke's RWA scale 
Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), sample 
1, study 1 ISD 
Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), sample 
2, study 1 ISD 
Kemmelmeier (2010), sample 1 RWA 
Kemmelmeier (2010), sample 2 RWA 
Van Hiel et al. (2004), sample 1 
12-item cultural conservatism scale + RWA + 
SDO 
Van Hiel et al. (2004), sample 2 
18-item cultural and economic conservatism 
scale RWA + SDO 
Van Hiel et al. (2004), sample 3 10-item conservatism scale 
  
Tam et al. (2008), sample 1 RWA 
Tam et al. (2008), sample 2 SDO 
Benjamin (2014) RWA 
Stern et al. (2013), sample 3 ISD 
Sargent (2004) ISD 
Hennes et al. (2012) ISD 
Kemmelmeier (2010), sample 1 RWA 
Stern & West (unpublished)  
Sterling et al. (unpublished/2016) ISD 
Sterling, Jost & Pennycook (2016) 
Single ideological self-placement regarding 
fiscal conservatism 
Ksiazkiewicz, Ludke & Krueger (2016) ISD 
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Altemeyer (1998) RWA + SDO 
Crowson (2009) Middendorp Cultural Conservatism Scale 
Bizer et al. (2004), sample 1 ISD 
Bizer et al. (2004), sample 2 ISD 
Crowson et al. (2005), sample 1 
McClosky and Bann's (1979) Conservatism-
Liberalism Scale on social, economic and 
political issues + RWA 
Crowson et al. (2005), sample 2 
McClosky and Bann's Conservatism-
Liberalism Scale on social, economic and 
political issues 
Feldman & Johnston (2014), sample 1 
Operational measure of economic 
conservatism + Operational measure of social 
conservatism 
Feldman & Johnston (2014), sample 2 
Operational measure of economic 
conservatism + Operational measure of social 
conservatism 
Kelemen et al. (2014) ISD 
  
Kemmelmeier (2010), sample 1 Altmeyer's RWA Scale 
Deppe (2015), sample 1 
attitudes on 19 issues (moral, punishment and 
economic issues) + ISD 
Deppe (2015), sample 2 
attitudes towards the legality of i.e. abortion, 
same sex marriage, prayer in public schools 
etc. (punishment, moral and economic issues) 
+ ISD 
Deppe (2015), sample 3 attitudes on 20 issues + ISD 
Deppe (2015), sample 4 
Agree/Disagree on 20 "issue positions" 
indicating ideology + ISD 
Duriez & Soenens (2006) RWA + SDO 
Sterling, Jost & Pennycook (2016) ISD 
Talhelm et al. (2015) sample 1 ISD 
Talhelm et al. (2015) sample 2 ISD 
Yilmaz & Saribay (2016), study 1 ISD 
Yilmaz & Saribay (2016), study 2 ISD 
Cornelis & Van Hiel (2006)  12-item Cultural Conservatism Scale 
Kahan (2013)  ISD 
Table 2 Information on papers from Jost, Sterling and Stern (2018) meta-analysis regarding the 
relationship of epistemic needs and ideology regarding the scale used to measure ideology. ▼ marks 
studies that were excluded from the analyses as they featured scales unfit to measure ideology. 






Overall average effect sizes (r) 
 Very surely reproducible 





sizes given by source 
samples 
Cognitive and perceptual rigidities 
Separate averages 0.34  
s.: 5 
n.s: 3 
n.f.: 6   0.16  
s.: 
n.s: 3 




Combined averages 0.34  
s.: 5 
n.s: 3 
n.f.: 6 0.34  
s.: 5 
n.s: 3 
n.f.: 6 0.30  
s.: 5 
n.s: 6 





Separate averages 0.55  
s.: 10 
n.s: 1 
n.f.: 18 0.35  
s.: 2 
n.s: 1 
n.f.: 1 0.27  
s.: 7 
n.s: 3 




Combined averages 0.55  
s.: 10 
n.s: 1 
n.f.: 18 0.53  
s.: 12 
n.s: 2 
n.f.: 19 0.46  
s.: 19 
n.s: 5 




Tolerance of Uncertainties 
Separate averages -0.26  
s.: 6 
n.s:  
n.f.:    -0.43 
s.: 2 
n.s: 1 
n.f.: 1  -0.15  
s.: 2 
n.s:  
n.f.:   
Combined averages -0.26  
s.: 6 
n.s:  
n.f.:    -0.33  
s.: 8 
n.s: 1 





Separate averages -0.20  
s.: 5 
n.s: 4 
n.f.: 2  -0.13  
s.:  
n.s: 1 
n.f.: 1  -0.10  
s.: 3 
n.s: 7 
n.f.:   -0.09  
s.:  
n.s: 3 
n.f.:   
Combined averages -0.20  
s.: 5 
n.s: 4 
n.f.: 2  -0.19  
s.: 5 
n.s: 5 
n.f.: 3  -0.15  
s.: 8 
n.s: 12 
n.f.: 3  -0.1 
s.: 8 
n.s: 15 
n.f.: 3  





Separate averages 0.23  
s.: 7 
n.s: 5 
n.f.: 2  0.59  
s.:  
n.s:  
n.f.: 1  0.14  
s.: 8 
n.s:  
n.f.:   0.19  
s.: 5 
n.s: 2 
n.f.:   
Combined averages 0.23  
s.: 7 
n.s: 5 
n.f.: 2  0.25  
s.: 7 
n.s: 5 
n.f.: 3 0.22  
s.: 15 
n.s: 5 




Need for Cognitive Closure 
Separate averages 0.26  
s.: 23 
n.s: 1 
n.f.:   0.38  
s.: 1 
n.s: 
n.f.:   0.17  
s.: 6 
n.s: 7 
n.f.:  2 0.20 
s.: 19 
n.s:  
n.f.:  2 
Combined averages 0.26  
s.: 23 
n.s: 1 
n.f.:   0.27  
s.: 24 
n.s: 1 
n.f.:   0.23 
s.: 30 
n.s: 8 
n.f.:  2 0.22  
s.: 49 
n.s: 8 
n.f.:  4 
Personal Needs for Order and Structure 
Separate averages 0.24  
s.: 10 
n.s: 5 
n.f.: 1   0.2  
s.:  
n.s: 
n.f.: 1   0.29 
s.: 5 
n.s: 
n.f.:    0.21  
s.: 8 
n.s: 4 
n.f.:    
Combined averages 0.24  
s.: 10 
n.s: 5 
n.f.: 1   0.24  
s.: 10 
n.s: 5 
n.f.: 2   0.25  
s.: 15 
n.s: 5 
n.f.: 2   0.24  
s.: 23 
n.s: 9 
n.f.: 2   
Need for Cognition 
Separate averages -0.17  
s.: 7 
n.s: 3 
n.f.: 1    -0.22  
s.: 2 
n.s: 
n.f.: -0.12  
s.: 4 
n.s: 2 




Combined averages -0.17  
s.: 7 
n.s: 3 
n.f.: 1    -0.18  
s.: 9 
n.s: 3 
n.f.: 1   -0.16  
s.: 13 
n.s: 5 
n.f.: 1   -0.14  
s.: 15 
n.s: 9 
n.f.: 1   
Cognitive Reflection 
Separate averages -0.19  
s.: 7 
n.s: 2 
n.f.:    -0.01  
s.:  
n.s: 1 
n.f.:  -0.13  
s.: 2 
n.s: 1 




Combined averages -0.19  
s.: 7 
n.s: 2 
n.f.:    -0.17  
s.: 7 
n.s: 3 
n.f.:     -0.16  
s.: 9 
n.s: 4 
n.f.:    -0.12  
s.: 14 
n.s: 14 





Table 3 Overall average effect sizes (r) of epistemic needs and ideology. S.: significant; n.s.: not significance; n.f.: information on significance not found. 
Combined averages include the results of all the previously noted results for the specific type of scale. ▼ marks studies that were excluded from the analyses 
as they featured scales unfit to measure ideology. 
Source. This table’s selection of papers was generated based on the meta-analysis by Jost (2017).  
 
Average effect sizes: Psychological and Direct (r) 
 Very surely reproducible 
Additional 
magnitude sizes 
given by source 
samples 
Kind of surely & Not surely 
reproducible Not reproducible (except ▼) 
 Psychological Direct Direct Psychological Direct Psychological Direct 
Cognitive and perceptual rigidities 
Separate 
averages 0.28  
s.: 4 
n.s: 2 
n.f.: 2 0.42  
s.: 1 
n.s:  
n.f.: 3 0.35  
s.:  
n.s:  
n.f.: 1   0.13  
s.:  
n.s: 2 
n.f.:     
Combined 
averages 0.28  
s.: 4 
n.s: 2 
n.f.: 2 0.42  
s.: 1 
n.s:  
n.f.: 3 0.40  
s.: 1 
n.s:  
n.f.: 4 0.28  
s.: 4 
n.s: 2 
n.f.: 2 0.32  
s.: 1 
n.s: 2 
n.f.: 4 0.28  
s.: 4 
n.s: 2 






averages 0.66  
s.: 4 
n.s:  
n.f.: 17 0.26  
s.: 4 
n.s: 1 
n.f.: 1 0.27  
s.: 10 
n.s: 1 
n.f.: 5   0.35  
s.: 2 
n.s: 1 








averages 0.66  
s.: 4 
n.s:  
n.f.: 17 0.26  
s.: 4 
n.s: 1 
n.f.: 1 0.26  
s.: 14 
n.s: 2 
n.f.: 6 0.66  
s.: 4 
n.s:  
n.f.: 17 0.28  
s.: 16 
n.s: 3 
n.f.: 7 0.63  
s.: 4 
n.s: 1 




Tolerance of Uncertainties 
Separate 
averages    -0.26 
s.: 6 
n.s:  
n.f.:  -0.15  
s.: 2 
n.s:  





averages    -0.26  
s.: 6 
n.s:  
n.f.:  -0.23  
s.: 8 
n.s:  
n.f.:   -0.23  
s.: 8 
n.s:  










averages  -0.14 
s.:  
n.s: 2 
n.f.:  3 -0.24 
s.: 5 
n.s: 2 
n.f.:   -0.09  
s.:  
n.s: 3 
n.f.:     -0.06  
s.:  
n.s: 1 
n.f.:   -0.02  
s.:  
n.s: 1 
n.f.:   -0.11  
s.: 3 
n.s: 6 
n.f.:   
Combined 
averages  -0.14 
s.:  
n.s: 2 
n.f.:  3 -0.24 
s.: 5 
n.s: 2 
n.f.:   -0.19 
s.: 5 
n.s: 5 
n.f.:   -0.14 
s.:  
n.s: 2 
n.f.:  3 -0.18 
s.: 5 
n.s: 6 
n.f.:   -0.12  
s.:  
n.s: 3 
n.f.:  3 -0.15  
s.: 8 
n.s: 12 
n.f.:   





n.f.:  1 0.31 
s.: 5 
n.s:  
n.f.: 1 0.19  
s.: 5 
n.s: 2 
n.f.:    0.59 
s.:  
n.s:  
n.f.: 1  0.26  
s.: 1 
n.s:  





averages 0.16  
s.: 1 
n.s: 3 
n.f.: 1 0.31  
s.: 5 
n.s:  
n.f.: 1 0.24  
s.: 10 
n.s: 2 
n.f.: 1 0.16  
s.: 1 
n.s: 3 
n.f.: 1 0.27  
s.: 10 
n.s: 2 
n.f.: 2 0.18  
s.: 2 
n.s: 3 




Need for Cognitive Closure 
Separate 
averages 0.44  
s.: 2 
n.s:  
n.f.: 0.24  
s.: 15 
n.s: 1 
n.f.: 0.20  
s.: 19 
n.s:  
n.f.:  2   0.38 
s.: 1 
n.s:  








averages 0.44  
s.: 2 
n.s:  






n.f.: 2 0.44  
s.: 2 
n.s:  
n.f.: 0.22  
s.: 35 
n.s: 1 
n.f.: 2 0.39  
s.: 3 
n.s:  




Personal Needs for Order and Structure 
Separate 
averages 0.27  
s.: 3 
n.s: 1 
n.f.: 1  0.19  
s.: 4 
n.s: 2 
n.f.:   0.21  
s.: 8 
n.s: 4 
n.f.:   0.2  
s.: 
n.s: 





averages 0.27  
s.: 3 
n.s: 1 
n.f.: 1  0.19  
s.: 4 
n.s: 2 
n.f.:   0.20  
s.: 12 
n.s: 6 
n.f.:   0.26  
s.: 3 
n.s: 1 
n.f.: 2  0.20  
s.: 12 
n.s: 6 
n.f.:   0.26  
s.: 3 
n.s: 1 
n.f.: 2  0.22  
s.: 16 
n.s: 6 
n.f.:   
Need for Cognition 
Separate 
averages -0.25  
s.: 4 
n.s:  
n.f.: 1 -0.14  
s.: 3 
n.s: 1 
n.f.:  -0.09  
s.: 2 
n.s: 4 
n.f.:   -0.22  
s.: 2 
n.s: 





averages -0.25  
s.: 4 
n.s:  
n.f.: 1 -0.14  
s.: 3 
n.s: 1 
n.f.:  -0.11  
s.: 5 
n.s: 5 
n.f.:   -0.25  
s.: 4 
n.s:  
n.f.: 1 -0.13  
s.: 7 
n.s: 5 
n.f.:   -0.25  
s.: 4 
n.s:  










averages -0.25  
s.: 2 
n.s: 
n.f.: -0.15  
s.: 3 
n.s: 
n.f.: -0.10  
s.: 5 
n.s: 10 
n.f.:   -0.01  
s.:  
n.s: 1 





averages -0.25  
s.: 2 
n.s: 
n.f.: -0.15  
s.: 3 
n.s: 
n.f.: -0.11  
s.: 8 
n.s: 10 
n.f.: -0.25  
s.: 2 
n.s: 
n.f.: -0.1  
s.: 8 
n.s: 11 







Table 4 Average effect sizes (r) of epistemic needs and ideology measured with Psychological and Direct scales. S.: significant; n.s.: not significance; n.f.: 
information on significance not found. Combined averages include the results of all the previously noted results for the specific type of scale. ▼ marks studies 
that were excluded from the analyses as they featured scales unfit to measure ideology. 
Source. This table’s selection of papers was generated based on the meta-analysis by Jost (2017).  
 
Average effect sizes: Symbolic and Operational (r) 
 Very surely reproducible 
Additional magnitude sizes 
given by source samples 
Kind of surely & Not surely 
reproducible Not reproducible (except ▼) 
 Symbolic Operational Symbolic Operational Symbolic Operational Symbolic Operational 








n.f.:   0.35  
s.: 
n.s: 
n.f.: 1     0.13 
s.: 
n.s: 2 
































n.f.:  0.58 
s.:  
n.s:  
n.f.: 1  0.32 
s.: 2 
n.s:  
n.f.:  0.26 
s.: 8 
n.s: 1 
n.f.: 5 0.33 
s.: 1 
n.s: 1 
n.f.:  0.37 
s.: 1 
n.s:  
n.f.: 1  0.17 
s.: 2 
n.s:  
n.f.:   0.46 
s.:  
n.s:  





n.f.:  0.58  
s.:  
n.s:  
n.f.: 1  0.23  
s.: 6 
n.s: 1 
n.f.:  0.28 
s.: 8 
n.s: 1 
n.f.: 6  0.25 
s.: 7 
n.s: 2 
n.f.:  0.29 
s.: 9 
n.s: 1 
n.f.: 7  0.24 
s.: 9 
n.s: 2 
n.f.:  0.30 
s.: 9 
n.s: 1 
n.f.: 8  
Tolerance of Uncertainties 
Separate 
averages   -0.16  
s.: 3 
n.s:  
n.f.:  -0.03 
s.: 1 
n.s:  
n.f.:  -0.26 
s.: 1 
n.s:  
n.f.:      -0.39  
s.: 1 
n.s:  









averages   -0.16 
s.: 3 
n.s:  
n.f.:  -0.03 
s.: 1 
n.s:  
n.f.:  -0.19  
s.: 4 
n.s:  
n.f.:  -0.03  
s.: 1 
n.s:  
n.f.:  -0.19  
s.: 4 
n.s:  
n.f.:  -0.21  
s.: 2 
n.s:  









n.f.:   -0.27 
s.: 3 
n.s: 1 
n.f.:     -0.09 
s.:  
n.s: 3 
n.f.:     -0.06 
s.:  
n.s: 1 
n.f.:   0.06 
s.:  
n.s: 3 
n.f.:   -0.2 
s.: 3 
n.s: 3 





n.f.:   -0.27 
s.: 3 
n.s: 1 
n.f.:   -0.24 
s.: 2 
n.s:  
n.f.:   -0.19 
s.: 3 
n.s: 4 
n.f.:   -0.24 
s.: 2 
n.s:  
n.f.:   -0.17 
s.: 3 
n.s: 5 
n.f.:   -0.06  
s.: 2 
n.s: 3 
n.f.:   -0.19  
s.: 6 
n.s: 8 
n.f.:   














n.f.:   0.59 
s.: 
n.s:  
n.f.: 1 0.11  
s.: 3 
n.s:  









































n.f.: 1 0.20 
s.: 15 
n.s:  
n.f.: 1 0.38 
s.: 1 
n.s:  














n.f.: 0.21  
s.: 16 
n.s: 1 
n.f.: 1 0.22 
s.: 18 
n.s:  
n.f.: 1 0.22 
s.: 17 
n.s: 1 
n.f.: 1 0.22 
s.: 18 
n.s:  
n.f.: 1 0.20 
s.: 20 
n.s: 5 









n.f.:  0.19 
s.: 1 
n.s: 1 
n.f.:  0.23 
s.: 2 
n.s:  
n.f.:  0.21 
s.: 6 
n.s: 4 
n.f.:      0.23 
s.: 3 
n.s:  








n.f.:  0.19 
s.: 1 
n.s: 1 
n.f.:  0.23 
s.: 5 
n.s: 
n.f.:  0.20 
s.: 7 
n.s: 5 
n.f.:  0.23 
s.: 5 
n.s: 
n.f.:  0.20 
s.: 7 
n.s: 5 
n.f.:  0.23 
s.: 8 
n.s: 





































































n.f.:   -0.01 
s.:  
n.s: 1  
n.f.: -0.10 
s.: 2 
n.s: 1  
























Table 5 Average effect sizes (r) of epistemic needs and ideology measured with Symbolic and Operational scales. S.: significant; n.s.: not significance; n.f.: 
information on significance not found. Combined averages include the results of all the previously noted results for the specific type of scale. ▼ marks studies 
that were excluded from the analyses as they featured scales unfit to measure ideology. 
Source. This table’s selection of papers was generated based on the meta-analysis by Jost (2017).  
 
Average effect sizes: Economic and Social (r) 
 Very surely reproducible 
Additional magnitude sizes 
given by source samples 
Kind of surely & Not surely 
reproducible Not reproducible (except ▼) 
 Economic Social Economic Social Economic Social Economic Social 
Cognitive and perceptual rigidities 
Separate 
averages     0.35 
s.: 
n.s: 
n.f.: 1   0.35 
s.: 
n.s: 
n.f.: 1   0.35  
s.: 
n.s: 
n.f.: 1   
Combined 
averages     0.35 
s.: 
n.s: 
n.f.: 1   0.35 
s.: 
n.s: 
n.f.: 1   0.35 
s.: 
n.s: 
n.f.: 1   
Dogmatism 
Separate 
averages     0.20 
s.: 2 
n.s:  
n.f.: 5  0.47 
s.: 2 
n.s:  
n.f.:           
Combined 
averages     0.20 
s.: 2 
n.s:  
n.f.: 5  0.47 
s.: 2 
n.s:  
n.f.:   0.20 
s.: 2 
n.s:  
n.f.: 5  0.47 
s.: 2 
n.s:  
n.f.:   0.20 
s.: 2 
n.s:  
n.f.: 5  0.47 
s.: 2 
n.s:  
n.f.:   









n.f.:      -0.26 
s.: 1 
n.s:  





n.f.:      -0.26 
s.: 1 
n.s:  
n.f.:      0.09 
s.: 1 
n.s:  






averages   -0.11 
s.:  
n.s: 1 
n.f.:   -0.09 
s.:  
n.s: 3 
n.f.:       -0.06 
s.:  
n.s: 1 
n.f.:       
Combined 
averages   -0.11 
s.:  
n.s: 1 
n.f.:   -0.09 
s.:  
n.s: 3 
n.f.:   -0.11 
s.:  
n.s: 1 
n.f.:   -0.09 
s.:  
n.s: 3 
n.f.:   -0.09 
s.:  
n.s: 2 
n.f.:   -0.09 
s.:  
n.s: 3 
n.f.:   -0.09 
s.:  
n.s: 2 
n.f.:   
Intolerance of Ambiguity 
Separate 
averages     0.17  
s.: 1 
n.s: 1 
n.f.:  0.24 
s.: 2 
n.s:  
n.f.:          
Combined 
averages     0.17 
s.: 1 
n.s: 1 
n.f.:  0.24 
s.: 2 
n.s:  
n.f.:  0.17 
s.: 1 
n.s: 1 
n.f.:  0.24 
s.: 2 
n.s:  
n.f.:  0.17 
s.: 1 
n.s: 1 




Need for Cognitive Closure 
Separate 






n.f.: 0.32  
s.: 4 
n.s:  
n.f.:         
Combined 
averages   0.2  
s.: 1 
n.s:  
n.f.: -0.01  
s.: 4 
n.s:  
















Personal Needs for Order and Structure 
Separate 
averages     0.03 
s.:  
n.s: 3 
n.f.:  0.34 
s.: 3 
n.s:  





averages     0.03 
s.:  
n.s: 3 
n.f.:  0.34 
s.: 3 
n.s:  
n.f.:      0.03  
s.:  
n.s: 3 



















































n.f.:   -0.01  
s.:  
n.s: 1  
n.f.:     
Combined 
averages     -0.04  
s.: 1 
n.s: 5 
n.f.: -0.16  
s.: 1 
n.s:  
n.f.: -0.04  
s.: 1 
n.s: 5 
n.f.: -0.08  
s.: 1 
n.s: 1 
n.f.: -0.04  
s.: 1 
n.s: 5 




Table 6 Average effect sizes (r) of epistemic needs and economic and social ideology. S.: significant; n.s.: not significance; n.f.: information on significance not 
found. Combined averages include the results of all the previously noted results for the specific type of scale. ▼ marks studies that were excluded from the 
analyses as they featured scales unfit to measure ideology. 
Source. This table’s selection of papers was generated based on the meta-analysis by Jost (2017). 
 
 Total overall Average effect sizes (r) 
  Economic Ideology Social Ideology 
average normal 0.06 
s.: 9 
n.s: 13 




average adjusted 0.09 
s.: 9 
n.s: 13 





average normal 0.15  
s.: 173 
n.s: 75 
n.f.:   47 
average adjusted 0.25  
s.: 173 
n.s: 75 





Table 7 Total overall average effect sizes (r) of ideological asymmetries regarding cognitive and perceptual rigidities, dogmatism, tolerance of uncertainties, 
integrative complexity, intolerance of ambiguity, need for cognitive closure, personal needs for order and structure, need for cognition, cognitive reflection as 
well as in combination with economic and social ideology. S.: significant; n.s.: not significance; n.f.: information on significance not found.  






Deutsche Zusammenfassung der Bachelor-Arbeit „Asymmetries in 
ideologies, a question of measurements?“ von Adriane Klaus, 
eingereicht am 15.04.2020 
Seit Jahrzehnten wird politische Ideologie von der Wissenschaft aus politischer, 
sozialwissenschaftlicher und psychologischer Perspektive betrachtet (Jost, Fitzsimons & Kay, 
2004, pp. 264; Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009, p. 309). Ein wiederkehrendes Thema im Kontext 
der Ideologie betrifft die Frage, was genau Individuen dazu bewegt eine bestimmte Ideologie 
anzunehmen und andere Glaubenssysteme in diesem Zuge abzuweisen. Die psychologische 
Perspektive verweist hier auf mögliche Verbindungen zwischen psychologischen 
Bedürfnissen und Inhalten von Ideologien (Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009, p. 314). Vor knapp 
drei Jahren fasste Jost die bis dahin erhobene Ergebnisse zusammen, die existentielle, 
relationale und epistemische Motive mit Ideologie in Zusammenhang setzten (Jost, 2017, p. 
171-194). Diese Analysen deuteten eindeutig auf eine Verbindung zwischen psychologischen 
Bedürfnissen und Ideologie. So stützten diese Ergebnisse die Annahme, dass Individuen 
zumindest teilweise von gewissen Ideologien auf Grund von strukturellen Passungen 
zwischen deren Inhalten und persönlichen Bedürfnissen angezogen werden (Jost, 2017, p. 
167). Bezüglich der epistemischen Motive umfassten diese Analysen 181 Stichproben aus 14 
Ländern mit insgesamt 133,796 Teilnehmern. Es wurden separate Analysen durchgeführt für 
Dogmatismus, kognitive Rigidität/ Rigidität der Wahrnehmung, Bedürfnisse nach kognitiver 
Geschlossenheit, persönliche Bedürfnisse nach Struktur und Ordnung, Intoleranz von 
Ambiguität, Bedürfnisse nach Kognition, kognitive Reflektion, integrative Komplexität und 
Toleranz von Unsicherheiten (Jost, 2017, p. 171). 
Diese Arbeit reevaluierte die von Jost (2017) zusammengetragenen Ergebnisse bezüglich 
ihrer Erhebungsmethoden des Konstrukts der Ideologie. Hierbei wurde zwischen direkten und 
indirekten Methoden, symbolischer und operationaler, sowie ökonomischer und sozialer 
Ideologie differenziert. Darüber hinaus wurden zusätzliche Ergebnisse aus den angegebenen 
Quellen-samples (Jost, 2017) erhoben, die direkt gemessene Ideologie und epistemische 
Bedürfnisse in Zusammenhang setzten aber nicht von Jost (2017) einbezogen wurden. 
Insgesamt wurden 295 Effektgrößen analysiert. Die mittleren Ergebnisse dieser Analysen 
wichen von Jost’s (2017) Analysen nie mehr als r = .10 ab und streuten in fast 89% der Fälle 
r ≤ .05. Somit konnten die Resultate von Jost (2017) überwiegend reproduziert werden. 
Anschließend werden separate Analysen durchgeführt, um den Einfluss eines Skalen-Typus 
auf die Ergebnisse zu untersuchen. Mittelwerte von indirekten und direkten Messmethoden 
wichen ungefähr r(8) = .12 (.35 < r < .03) voneinander ab, Mittelwerte zugehörig zu 





< r < .28) und die zu sozialer und ökonomischer Ideologie zugehörigen Werte wichen mit 
ungefähr r(8) = .19 (0 < r < .36) am meisten im Durchschnitt voneinander ab. Da die Sample-
Größen im Falle von sozialer und ökonomischer Ideologie vergleichsweise klein waren, wurde 
jeweils ein Gesamt-Mittelwert ermittelt, der die Relationen von sozialer sowie ökonomischer 
Ideologie und allen betrachteten epistemischen Motiven umfasste. Auch diese Mittelwerte 
wiesen auf einen Einfluss der Messmethode auf die Ergebnisse hin und die mittleren 
Effektgrößen wichen um r = .21 voneinander ab. 
Zusammengefasst stimmten Mittelwerte unterschiedlicher Messmethoden nur in drei Fällen 
überein und wichen r ≥ .05 in 16 von 25 Fällen voneinander ab. Somit unterstützen die 
Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit eine differenziertere Herangehensweise an die Methoden zur 
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